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CHAPlER I 
ATTITUDES EVIDENT IN 1919 
An overwhelming majority of the 
American people is in favor of 
the League of Nations. 
When President Wilson made this statement in an address 
at the .Metropolitan Opera House in New York City on March 4, 
1919, the day before sailing back to France, he set many an 
American mind to thinking and questioning. Here he had made 
a statement presented as a fact and many an alert American 
queried the reliability of it. How did he know? How was 
it humanly possible for anyone to know? 
Still there are ways of sounding opinion. one such way 
is to ask newspaper editors allover the country, as each of 
them, no doubt, watches the drift of opinion in his district, 
and his own opinion tends to guide that of his :readers. That 
is just what the Literary Digestd:ld. The editor of this 
magazine sent to the editor of every daily newspaper in the 
United states a letter asking his attitude toward joining "the 
proposed League of Nations".2 He was then asked to tell, if 
pOSSible, the attitude of his community toward it. The respon 
seemingly broke all records for 1,377 editors replied. 
1 Woodrow Wilson, The Hope of the World, 
Brothers, New York, 1920,~2. -----
2 The Li terp Dige st, ]'unk and Wagna11s 
April 5, ~9, 9-1 • 
1 
Harper and 
Co., New York, 
~--------------------~a~--... &.a., .  $"!$.i •.• i"" •. II:III 
In answer to the question, "Do you favor the proposed 
League of Nations?", the results showed that 718 of the 
editors replied "Yes"; 181 answered "No"; and 478 voted 
"Conditional".3 
Another means of anal71$ing the replies to this press 
poll is by the circulation of the cooperating newspapers. 
The follOwing table shows this most clearly. 
Total Circulation of 
Replying Newspapers4 
For ••. ~ ••••• 9,886,449 
Against ••••• 4,326,882 
Conditional 6,792,461 
~1,005,79~ 
Independent 
For ••••.•.• 3,648,141 
Against •••• 2,955,706* 
Conditional 2,447,660 
9,051,507 
2 
*Including the 2,488,976 
circulation of the Hearst 
papers. 
Democratic 
lor ••••••••. 4,327,052 
Against..... 121,912 
Conditional 508,384 
4,957,348 
3 Ibid., 13. 
-
4 ~., 9. 
Republican 
For •••••••• 1,911,256 
Against •••• 1,249,264 
Conditional 3,836,417 
6,996,937 
In studying this press poll of opinion we must realize 
that it was taken early in April, while the Covenant of the 
League was st ill in the Conference and before it 1II8S presented. 
to the Senate. The attitudes reflected in the results are not 
colored one way or the other by the debates and reaction to the 
League Covenant in the Senate. 
Two further pOints deserve emphasis. If we are to 
regard this poll as the people of 1919 did, we Will think of 
it as only a straw vote. It attempted to prove nothing in 
any final way. No such investigation ever can. But it 
afforded some basiS for a guess -- indeed, an excellent basis 
and it was considered the best indication short of a national 
vote. 
Some of the opinions quoted were those of small news-
papers in small communities, and many may think that these 
opinions should not be considered as important enough to 
warrant an analysis, however, half the people lived in small 
communities. Those newspapers reflected the opinions of 
farmers, of miners, of village shopkeepers. Not infrequently 
they were more definitely in line witb local sentiment than 
were the large newspapers of large oommunities. Not 
infrequently they offset the influenoe of metropolitan 
journals oirculating in small communities. Their numbers all 
4 
told were impressive. What they may have lacked in 
individual importance they made up in aggregate importance. 
To show the :results on a nationwide basis the 
accompanying map illustrates the sectional variations of 
the attitude of the American people toward the proposed 
League of Nations. 
r-""-,,_------------""'-------·--.·-----··-·· 
I 0l' ! 
I 
This map sho~the country divided into nine sections, 
geographical sections along state lines. The number of votes 
refers to the opinlt:ons of the 1,377 editors replying to the 
press poll of ~he Literary Digest.5 
In no section of the COlmtry do we find eVidence of a 
definite and overwhelming dislike of the League of Nations. 
Rather it seems that the people in April 1919 wanted to gain 
admission to the proposed League. 
Another means that was used to learn the attitude of 
a specific group toward the League of Nations was the poll 
of the faculties and students of the colleges and universities 
of the country. 
Much attention and publicity were attracted to this 
poll due partly to the discussions in the Senate over the 
returns. Senator Hitchcock, of Nebraska, introduced into 
the COJ,?gressional,Record. a synop*is of the returns and that 
started the bitter debates. 6 
In these discussions is given a very complete and 
detailed accolmt of the manner in which the poll was conducted. 
Blank ballots were submitted to the faculties and students. 
5 Ibid. 
-. 
6 COngreSSiOnal Record, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1920, v.59, pt.l, 1276-1283 
pi 
These ballots stated the following questions: 
1. I favor ratifioation of League and 
Treaty without reservations and 
amendment s. 
2. I am opposed to ratification in any form. 
:3 • I favor rat ifioat ion of the Treaty but 
only with the Lodge reservations. 
4. I favor a oompromise between the Lodge 
and the Demooratio reservations in 
order to facilitate ratification. 7 
These blank ballots were approved by Senator Lodge and 
Senator Hitchoock each representing the opposite ViewpOint. 
Two arguments were placed before the students and faoulties 
in printed form, one was prepared by Senator Lodge and the 
other by Senator Hitchoock. Senator Lodge argued for 
ratifioation with the Lodge reservations while Senator 
Hitohoook opposed the Lodge reservations, but stated that 
reservations had become. inevitable. Senator Hitohcook 
maintained: 
I did not oontend at all for ratifioation 
without compromise. I maintained that the 
only praotioal question was what reservation 
Should be taken, and urged a oompromise 
between the Lodge and Democratio 
re servat ions. 
Therefore despite the fact that no argument was presente 
in tavor of simple ratification the largest vote polled, 
7 Ib id., 1281. 
-
8 Cong. ~., v.59, pt.l, 2182. 
about 45~, was for unqualified ratification. About 3~ 
voted for compromise :reservations, about 2~ for the Lodge 
reservations, and less than l~ against ratification in 
any form, 300 colleges reported. 9 
This referendum, oontaining the basic proportions of 
the two main politioal parties, was voted upon early in 
February 1920, with 410 oolleges reporting, which showed an 
inorease of 110 colleges over the previous total of 300. 
In these 410 colleges and universities 139,788 votes were 
oast. The results given out by the press oontain the 
following figures: 
7 
Compromise between the Lodge and Demooratio 
reservations --------------------------- 49,653 votes Ratifioation without reservation ------- 48t23~ 
Ratification with the Lodge reservation 27,970 
Opposition to the treaty in any form --- 13,933 10 
Even the ohief proponent in the Senate for the League, 
Senator Hitohoock, in referring to the final results stated: 
This shows a sentiment for uncompromising 
and unqualified ratifioation muoh stronger 
than I had supposed - a sentiment so strong 
as to cause amazement. ll 
9 Litera!l Digest, February 14, 1920, 33. 
10 Ibid. 
-
11 ~. ~., v. 59,pt .1, 2183. 
As may well be thought the Significance and value of 
this vote was variously estimated. Each seemed to be able 
to interpret the results to his own gain. In the Senate 
the findings were attaoked bitterly by Senator MoCormick. 
In his (Wilson's] appeal to the faoulties 
and students of the colleges and universities, 
the very elements of our population with 
whioh he has been most of his life most 
intimately aSSOCiated, and to whioh he was 
most confident in his appeal, he was 
overwhelmingly defeated and rejeoted. 
The intelleotuals are at one with the rest 
of the people in opposing the denationalization 
of the United states.12 -
The figures actually speak for themselves. It seems 
rather apparent that neither Side oould feel oonfident of 
a clear out majority. Actually the figures show that if 
e 
the three divisions of ratification in some form are grouped 
together 125,855 voted for ratification against 13,933 in 
opposition to the Treaty in any form. 13 
In 1919 and 1920 it seemed almost the fashion to express 
one's opinion on the League question. Many of the leaders of 
the country reflected their attitude, during this period, 
toward the League of Nations in speeches and other modes 
of expression. 
12 ~. 
13 !!! York Times, leb. 10, 1920. 
9 
On March 1, 1919, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of Navy, 
in a speech celebrating the drafting of the Peace-League Plan 
gave a very lofty interpretation to the League. 
Any man in this country who tries 
to stir up opposition to the League of 
Nations will be guilty of trying to 
pave the way for another world deluge 
of blood, and will be just as great a 
criminal as the ex-Kaiser. This 
document makes Magna Carta and the 
Declaration of Independenoe mere 
forerunners of an immortal instrument 
that bleSseSl$ll the world for all 
generations. 4 
Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator, in an address 
at Leland Stanford University on October 3, 1919 gave his 
personal view of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
To me every line of the covenant 
is the 'complete negation of militarism •••• 
Opposition to it there arose entirely 
from the representatives of the old 
militaristic regimes and from the 
reaotionaries of the world in general. lS 
Later in October "Teddy" Roosevelt gave a statement to 
the press oonoe:rning his opinion of the League. 
14 Literary Digest, Maroh 1, 1919, 18. 
15 Times, Oot. 4, 1919. 
The great civilized nations of the 
world •••• should combine by Solemn agreement 
in this great rgrld league for the peacelof 
righteousness. 
In the MarCh 22, 1919 issue of the Literary Digest, 
attention is oalled to the very serious omission in the 
platform of the League of Nations as oabled from Paris. 
Nowhere in the platform, nor ••• 
in the proceedings that led up to its 
promulgation is to be found any hint of ••• 
recognition of the faot, generally 
accepted by civilized humanity, of the 
existence of a Supreme Being •••• 
Man proposes but God disposes, and 
unless the League of Nations takes into 
aocount - not alone in word, but in 
spirit.- the fact of God, it is fore-
doomed to failure, just as every 
previous plan and scheme of men to 
insure permanent peaoe has broken down 
under the pressure of national ambition, 
hatred, or avarioe - traits that have 
not yet been banished from the world. 
there must be something more potent than 
bayonets or battle-8hips, neeaful as 
both are under present world oonditions, 
as the ultimate authority. Back of the 
cit izen is the state - using the term in 
its broad sense - and back of the state 
is, or will be, the League ot Nations. 
Back of thi League must be God, if it is 
to endure. 7 
16 Ibid., Oct. 19, 1919. 
17 Literary Digest, March 22, 1919, 7. 
10 
au Q . 
11 
A still more cynical view of the League is championed 
by J. C. Walsh, staff correspondent of the Oatholic weekly, 
America, who writes dubiously of the League, reviewing the 
failure of similar dreams since Henry IV and Queen Elizabeth. 
He sees also some of the principals at the Peace Oonference 
as being: 
••• so eagerly intent upon carving 
the carcasses of this and that empire as 
to be uncertain whether there is any 
oonscious concern whatever for mere 
humanity; whether the League of Nations 
is anything more than a convenient 
subject on which to engage conversation 
while business of immediate and intimate 
importanoe is being dispatched. 18 
In a petition sent to the Senate, Dr. Watson, Secretary 
of the War Work Commission of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
South of Washington, D. C. recommended: 
That we urge Senate of United States ••• 
conSideration of the ••• treaty and 
the league of nations ••• with such 
reservations as will not in any way 
weaken the high purpose s of that 
document or make necessary its 
withdrawal or its resubmission. 19 
In the Oon~ressional Record many reflections of opinion 
are found in the letters, petitions and telegrams sent to the 
18 America, February 15, 1919, 463. 
19 Cong.~, V.59, pt. 1, 413. 
j 11 
LiLiiJS 
12 
Senate. Instances are found where many colleges sent 
statements urging consideration of the League. One suoh 
petition was signed by Rev. Dr. Henry Churchill King, president 
of Oberlin College, Ohio and of 118 members of the faculty 
favoring the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany •• 
"with such interpretatic reservations as may be proper-and 
necessary.n20 Senator Chamberlain of Oregon presented a 
statement from Reed College, Portland, Oregon, in reference to 
the vote of the faculty on the peace treaty. 
We, the undersigned members of the 
faculty of Reed College, are convinced of 
the supreme importance of the ratification 
by the Senate, as soon as pOSSible, of the 
treaty of peace with such interpretative 
reservations as may be proper and necessary 
to protect American interests, but which 
recognize the solemn duty of this country 
as a world power to assume its fair share 
of responsibility for the preservation of 
the world peace and justice. We urge the 
Senators from Oregon to promote this action. 
We believe that a strong majority of the 
most intelligent and public-spirited citizens 
of all part ies in the state will support 
them in favoring a resolution ratifying the 
treaty of peace with the League of Nations 
covenant in terms that will make it clearly 
unnecessary to resubmit t~i treaty to the 
general peace conference. 
20 !lli., 959. 
21 ~., 1070. 
··.2! .I .. !. 
13 
Another petition was signed by Rev. John W. Hofrman, D.D. 
president of Ohio Wesleyan University, and 29 members of the 
faculty, favoring the League. A resolution was also 
unanimously adopted by the faculty of Toledo Universi~y, Ohio, 
favoring the League. A resolution was also unanimously 
adopted by the faculty of Toledo University, Ohio, favoring 
ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany and the 
covenant. 22 At a public meeting held in Pueblo, Qolorado, 
January 2, 1920, the following resolutions were adopted: 
Whereas it is apparent that a strong 
effort is being made by interests not 
wholly in accord with Americanism to 
force a compromise upon the adoption 
of the ••• League of Nations. 
Resolved by the citizens of Pueblo, 
Oolorado, regardless of party •••• That 
we are unalterably opposed to any 
compromise in any way changing or 
modifying the Senate reservations, and 
that the Knox resolutions declaring 
peace be adopted. 23 
Oreeping into the petitions now was found some evidence 
that the people were becoming uneasy of the fact that 
technically they were still at war with Germany. Emphasis 
was being laid not so much on the League but on ratification 
22 Ibid., 1083 
-
23 Ibid., 590 
-
of the treaty with Germany. The above quotation shows this 
tendency and in the following petition it is also quite 
evident. This statement was presented January 26, 1920, 
representing 20,000 California women requesting the Senate 
to ratify the treaty of peace with Germany and the covenant 
of the League of Nations. Attention is brought to the 
fact that: 
••• Armistice day is a year and a 
quarter past. Yet the departments 
of our Government are not agreed as 
to the American relations with her 
late enemies and to her allies in war. 
Into half a dozen camps they are 
divided, questioning the motives of 
the treaty, .the practicability of the 
covenant, the definition of words, the 
contradiction of articles, the spirit 
of allies abroad and citizen at home. 
Surely the world will be nearer the 
milleniwn when war is as hard to make 
as peace. 24 
14 
Even the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce laid pressure 
upon the legislature. In a telegram dated Deoember 20, 1919, 
this organization stated, "We believe that with the exoeption 
of an unimportant minority the people of the U. S. desire to 
have a league of nations •••• n25 This apparently was not 
suffioient, for a month later the board of direotors of the 
24 ~., 2037. 
25 rug.., 1920. 
1 j : i!il.! i. lIIIII 
15 
Chamber of Commerce of the United states of America sent a 
resolution. urging "the President and the Senate to take 
prompt aotion with respeot to the treaty of peaoe with 
Germany with such reservations as will fully safeguard 
every fundamental prinoiple of the Government of the United 
States. "26 
t 
Prom all these statements, resolutions, telegrams and 
petitions found in the. Congressional Record it is evident 
that oonsiderable pressure was laid upon the legislators for 
action. In an article from the New York Sun of January 27, 
..-.--.. ~
1920 Professor Philip Marshall Brown, professor of Inter-
national Law at Prinoeton University takes exception to this 
coeroion. He oontinues by stating: 
I desire to register a vigorous 
protest against the organized moral 
coercion now being exerted on the 
Senate at a time when it should be 
most respeoted in the exercise of one 
of its most important funotions, 
namely, the treaty-making power. The 
pressure whioh has been brought to 
bear on the Senate ••• is most 
insidious and dangerous • 
••• The Senate owes a duty to the 
Amerioan people to reserve its judgement 
and action in order to safeguard national 
interests. 
If the real objeot of popular 
sentiment is merely the speedy attainment 
26 Ibid., 1972. 
of peace and the olarifioation of 
an ambiguous Situation, then let us 
restore a legal state of peaoe and 
reserve the disoussion of prinoiples 
it 1 
for a time when reason oan assert itsel~ 
and the people of the U.S. can fully 
understand the exaot nature of the 
obligations they are asked to assume •••• 27 
SAUd 1 ![ lIIIIII 
16 
It is from statements like that and more espeoially 
of those similar in tenor to that of Senator Borah t s that 
made it oomparatively easy to use the League as the spring-
board in the oampaign of 1920. 
On December 11, 1919 Senator Borah expressed the 
. following viewpoint • 
• •• I trust sinoerely that it (the 
treaty) is dead and that it will stay 
dead. It is the best thing the Senate 
has done since it has been in session 
or for many years, and if it does nothing 
else e~cept to kill the treaty it will 
be ent it led to the grat i tude of the . 
American people for all time to come • 
••• The American people have a way of 
assuming jurisdiction and retaining jurisdiction until they render final judgement and this question has gone 
to the jurisdiction of the American 
people and it will be definitely and 
finally settled by them in the election 
of 1920. It does not make any difference 
how we vote here in the meant ime or what 
proceedings we may have this question is 
now in the minds of the masses of the 
AmeriO~ people and you can not eliminate 
it •••• 
27 !!!!2!!~, January 27, 1920. 
28 Cong., Reo., V.59, pt.l, 919. 
&Iii . iii! is t J 12$ $1111::_ 
CHAPTER II 
ATTITUDES IN ELECTION YEARS 
Peace! Progress! Prosperityll 
These vote getting exclamations were the watchwords 
of the Democratic Party and sounded the keynote of the 
campaign of 1920. 
Governor James M. Cox of OhiO, publisher of the Daypon 
News, was the choice of the Democratic Party for the 
-
Presidency and his running mate was Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The Republican Party placed 
its hopes on Senator Warren G. Harding, also of Ohio and also 
a publisher of an . D.h1() paper, the Marion~. Striking for 
the Vice-Presidency was Governor calvin Coolidge of 
lfassachusetts. 
The completed platform of the Democratic party commended 
the Fresident for his courage and good faith and charged that 
the Republican Senate refused to ratify the treaty merely 
because it was the product of Democratic statesmanship.2 
1 The Democratic Text Book - 1~~0, issued by The 
Democratic-rational Comm~e~20, • 
2 ~., 8. 
17 
.:sUi:: iii2 :a : J" 
fhe League plank declared: 
The Democratic Party favors The 
League of Nations as the surest, if not 
the only, practical means of maintaining 
the peace of the world and terminating 
the insufferable burden of great military 
and naval establishments.3 
The Republican Party did not come out as boldly for 
the League of Nations as did the Democratic Party. In its 
platform of 1920 the Republicans maintained: 
The Republican party stands for 
agreement among the nations to preserve 
the peace of the world. We believe that 
such an international association must 
be based upon international justice, and 
must provide methods which shall maintain 
the rule of public right by the development 
of law and the decision of impartial courts, 
and which shall secure instant and general 
international conference whene~er peace 
shall be threatened by political action, 
so that the nations pledged to do and 
inSist upon what is just and fair may 
exercise their influence and power for 
the prevention of war.4 
Thus, the usual aim of the platform-makers to carve 
a plank for a controversial question upon which all could 
stand was achieved in a remarkable degree. The first 
paragraph rea4 well to those who wanted the League. It 
promised at the very least a consultative part with nations 
3 llli,., 10. 
4 Republican Text ~ - 1920, 6. 
; a dad 2. 
whereby "instant and ~neral conference" should be had 
whenever the peace was threatened. The se cond paragraph 
denounced the covenant in words grave enough to suit any 
bitter opponent of the League as "oertain" to produce "the 
injustice, hostility, and oontroversy among nations whioh 
it proposed to prevent".5 
To prove this further,.that the Republioans did not 
try to urge the League referendum on the voters as did 
.1.9 
the Demoorats, it is only neoessary to consult the utteranoes 
of Harding. The following exoerpt, found in an address by 
Harding, shows the oharacteristio tendency, as the campaign 
wears on, for the Republicans to underplay the League and 
to stress other policies of the platform. 
It will avail nothing to disouss 
in detail the league covenant, which 
was oonceived for world super-government, 
negotiated in misunderstanding, and 
intolerantly urged and demanded by its 
administration sponsors, who resisted 
every effort to safeguard Amerioa and 
who finally rejeoted when such 
safeguards were inserted. 6 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Ibid., 26. 
.20 
Harding in his acceptance speech at Marion, Ohio, July 
23, 1920, attempted to clarify the Republican attitude., 
toward the League from the time it entered the Senate until 
this campaign. 
We Republicans of the Senate ••• 
when we saw the structure of a world 
super-government taking visionary form, joined in a becoming warning of our 
devot ion to this republic. If the 
torch of constitutionalism had not been 
dimmed, the delayed peace of the world 
and the tragedy of disappointment and 
Europe's misunderstanding of America 
easily might have been avoided. The 
Republicans of the Senate halted the 
barter of independent American eminence 
and influence which it proposed to 
exchange for an obscure and unequal 
place in the merged government of the 
world. Our party means to hold the 
heritage of American nationality 
unimpaired and unsurrendered. It is 
better to be the free and disinterested 
agent of international justice and 
advancing civilization, with the 
covenant of conscience, then be 
shackled by a written compact Which 
surrenders our freedom of action and 
gives to a military alliance the right 
to proclaim Americats duty to the world. 
No surrender of rights to a world 
councilor its military alliance, no 
assumed mandatory, however appealing, 
ever shall summon the sons of this 
republic to war. Their supreme 
sacrifice shall only be asked for 
America and its call of honor, there 
is sanctity in the right we will not 
delegate. 7 
7 ~., 26-29. 
p ; 
: j hi L • 
21 
Thus construing the purpose of the covenant and brushing 
the League aside, he proceeded to say that the way was "very 
simple tl • 8 Explaining how simple it was, he continued: 
With a Senate advising as the 
constitution contemplates, I would 
hopefully approach the nations of 
Europe and of the earth, proposing 
that understanding which makes us 
a willing participant in the 
consecration of the nations to a 
new leadership •••• 9 
The first move of the candidates of the Democratic 
Party was to force the League of Nat ions to the front as the 
leading campaign issue. This mode of procedure on the League 
issue was brought out clearly after a conference between the 
Democratic nominees at Columbus, even as early as July 1920. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic Vice-Presidential 
candidate told the newspaper men that the League of Nations 
was to be the "big outstanding issue of the campaign".lO 
Later in July we again find the Vice-Presidential 
candidate stating the attitude of his party toward the League 
and also the attitude of the Republican party seen through the 
eyes of a Democrat. 
e Ibid. 
-
9 Ibid., 45. 
10 
The Democratic party enters the 
campaign with the clear cut purpose of 
proving that the world war has not been 
fought in vain. Senator Harding says, 
"Should the Democrats win, the treaty and 
the league will be rat If ied. " He is right. 
No one, probably not even Senator Harding 
himself, knows what would happen should 
the Republicans win. • •• one branch of 
his supporters, such as Senator Hiram 
Johnson, assures the nation that a 
Republican victory means no League of 
Nations. Another branch, led by such 
men as former President Taft, assures 
the nation that a Republican victory 
means the acceptance of the League With 
certain undefined reservations •••• 
One of the prominent issues is thus 
be coming early and clearly drawn. A 
Democratic victory means ratification of 
the Treaty and the League of Nations, which, 
as the world knows, is already constituted. 
A Republican victory means that the United 
states with RuSSia, Mexico, and Turkey 
shall remain outside. The election of 
Cox means that the United states, in 
particular with the other civilized 
nations of the world, Will, through the 
League of Nations solve international 
difficulties and 'prevent a recurrence of 
the holocaust of 1914-1918. 1 
22 
We find the Democratic candidates much more articulate 
in reference to the League of Nations. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
is especially more vociferious than Calvan Coolidge, the 
Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, for in his acceptance 
11 Literary Digest, July 20, 1920, 9. 
speeoh at Hyde Park, New York, August 9, 1920, we find 
Mr. Roosevelt again dealing almost wholly with the League. 
The League of Nations is a 
practical solution of a praotical 
situation. It is no more perfect 
than our original constitution •••• 
was perfect. It is not anti-national, 
it is anti-war. No super-nation, 
binding us to the decision of its 
tribunals, is suggested, but the 
method and maohinery by which the 
opinion of oivilization may beoome 
effective against those who seek 
war is at last within the reaoh of 
humanity •••• 12 
23 
Seldom do we find a Presidential candidate stating as 
forcibly the marked oleavage between the two parties. At 
Tulsa, Oaklahoma, on Ootober 1, Governor Cox said, "Now he 
(Harding] is against the League I am for it. "13 And again 
at Nashville, Tennessee, we find Cox stating, "We will aocept 
any reservations that help to olarify. We will aooept any 
reservations that help to strengthen. ,,14 
As the oampaign wore on and With more and more pressure 
and bitter words being laid on both Sides, Senator Harding, 
at Marion, OhiO, Ootober 11, 1920, oame out with a olear 
12 Demooratio~, 33. 
13 Literary Digest, October 10, 1920, 10. 
14 Ibid., Ootober 23, 1920, 6. 
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statement of his position. "I am in favor of a world 
association - call it what you will, the name is of slight 
consequence - that will discourage or tend to prevent war."15 
Again in October the ooncentration of forces made necessary a 
summation of his attitudes. In his important Des Moines 
speeoh, Harding oame out forcibly against the obligations of 
the League, and he too, made quite evident the difference of 
policy between the two parties, and the plan he would follow 
when elected - an assooiation of nations, rather than the 
League of Nations. 
I do not want to clarify these 
obligations; I want to turn my baok 
on them. It is not interpretation but 
rejection I am seeking. 
The Demooratic oandidate in his 
speeoh of acceptance has said, "A 
definite plan has been agreed upon. 
The League of Nations is in operation. 
Senator Harding as the Republican 
candidate for the Presidency, proposes 
in plain words that we remain out of it. 
As the Democratic candidate I favor 
gOing in." . 
The issue, therefore, is olear, 
I understand the position of the 
Demooratio candidate, and he understands 
mine •••• As soon as possible after my 
election, I shall advise with the best 
minds in the United States, and 
"espeoially I shall consult in advance 
with the Senate ••• to the end that we 
shall have an assooiation of nations 
for thi6promotion of international 
peaoe. 
15 Republican!!!!, 20. 
16 Ibid., 45-48. 
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In an appeal to Republicans and Independents who favor 
the League, Chairman White of the Democratic National 
Committee said, in commenting on thiS concret~ statement of 
Harding's favoring an association that, 
Senator Harding has tried to 
revive his "Bush-League", his 
association of nations that will not 
associate. All sensible people know 
that the forty nations now composing 
the major League, the League of Nations, 
will not abandon it at Mr Hardings 
behest, and that if he were to form 
his separate association after his 
separate German peace it would have 
to be composed of Mexico, Bolshevik 
Russia, Germany, Austria, Turkey and 
United states. 
The only definite thing he has 
ever said was in his Des Moines speech. 
That statement made a square issue and 
rendered it certain that the only hope 
to secure our adherence to the League 
of Nations or any other modification of 
it is through the election of Governor 
Cox. 17 . 
Democrats attached great significance to the repudiation 
of Harding on the League issue by Herbert Parsons, a former 
Republican National Committeeman, and an active New York 
Republican. In a letter resigning his membership in the 
New York County Republican Committee, he announced his 
intention to vote for Cox because: 
17 Literary Digest, October 2;, 1920, 13. 
A ,@ -, 
The issue to the American voter is 
between gOing into the League with 
reservations and not going into it 
at all. Harding is and will be for 
not going into it at all. The only 
likelihood that the United States will 
under Harding, enter the League is 
that he will find it impossible to 
erect an association of nations or a 
new league and so will have to orawl 
. into this one .18 
26 
As the League had many opponents so too did it have 
proponents and among them oan be oounted the American 
Federation of Labor. In 1920 this organization with a 
membership of four million did not oome out officially for 
any candidate but practically endorsed the Democratic 
platform. Samuel Gompers, president of the A. F. of L 
believed the Democratic platform more nearly in accord with 
the Federation's "declaration of human rights" than the 
Republican platform. The Non-Part1sian Political Campaign 
Committee after investigating the past attitudes of the two 
principal candidates toward labor legislation reported the 
"reoord of Governor Cox uniformly favorable to labor and 
that of Senator Harding sometimes favorable and sometimes 
" unfavorable. 19 
18 Democratic~, 85. 
19 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of ~ and Labor, 
E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1925, II, 323. 
,Q4 ,44 
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Why, if it appears that there ~ere So many supporter$ 
of the League, did not the Democratic candidates win the 
election? Was Wilson given his solemn referendum as the 
following article stated he would? "Mr. Wilson is to be 
granted his solemn referendum ••• and the issue at this 
election is whether we are going into the Wilson Covenant 
or staying out."20 Being faced with the prospects the !!! 
York Times believed would occur, one may wonder why the 
-
Democrats did not win. The Times stated: "The men and 
women of the country on November 2, will vote for peace or 
war, for safeguarded and enduring peace, or for certain and 
frequent wars."2l 
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In analyzing the election results we find that Harding's 
victory showed the largest shift of voting strength between 
the two parties which ever occurred in four years.22 At 
first glance this does appear as a repudiation but upon 
further study we are less certain that such is the case. 
Is it correct to hail this overwhelming victory solely as 
a repudiation of the League? In attempting to answer this 
question we are led not to the answer directly but to more 
questioning. Could it have been desire for a change, hatred 
20 
21 
22 
Un ivers 
Editorial in Chicago Daily Tribune, October 23, 1920 
Editorial in New York Times, October 29, 1920. 
Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential~, Stanford 
Press Stanford California 21 
-
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of Wilson, di,sapproval of the League of Nations, disapproval 
of some other features of the Treaty of Ver~ailles, the 
effect of the women's vote or of prohibition, of the large 
Republican campaign chest and the large and powerful 
Republican press1 In posing these questions we reveal the 
number of issues present in any thorough explanation of 
this supposed mandate against the League in the election 
of 1920. 
Irving Fisher, Professor of Political Economy at Yale 
University, in an analysis of the election, stated that the 
dominant factors were two: 
The natural reaction against the 
party in power, which inevitably 
accumulates enemies in proportion to 
its length of office holding its 
activities and agressiveness and the 
historical untoward accidents for 
which the party in power is always 
held responsible by unthinking 
masses of men. 23 
Certainly there was a desire for change. There was a general 
disgruntlement among the people because of the numerous 
discomforts which the country had suffered during the last 
four years including especially the high cost of living. 
The people evidently wanted to try their luck with another 
party to see if that would bring relief in some way. 
23 Times, March 6, 1921. 
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It is interesting to observe that the high cost of 
living, besides being a thorn in the flesh, gave an acoidental 
lift to the Republioans. It was one reason for their large 
campaign fund. When the profits were rising as they did 
during the years immediately preoeding the eleotion, the 
prooess oreates profits to business men, and the Republican 
Party had a greater oonstituenoy among business men than the 
Democratio Party. 
However large the number of Republioan advooates of 
the League who were held in line by the Harding promises to 
remodel the League of Nations or provide an effeotive 
substitute - and they must have made a great army - there 
can be no doubt of the torrent of anti-Wilson support that 
flowed into the Harding headquarters. 
Many different racial extraotions deserted the Wilson 
camp. Some of the Italian-Americans were disgruntle.d over 
Fiume. Some of the Irish-Americans were angry because 
Irish freedom had not been provided for and because England 
was supposed to have six votes in the League. The German-
Americans and the Austrian-Americans hated the reparation 
features of the Versailles Treaty.24 
24 Ibid. 
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The editor of an Italian daily newspaper called on 
Harding to assure him that, "The Fiume question had made all 
Americans of Italian extraction Republicans. n25 George Viere 
nationally known leader of organized German-American 
sentiment promised to deliver the votes of that huge group 
to Harding. Governor Oox, he admitted, might be an estimable 
gentleman, but Viereck added: "We do not know; neither do 
we care. As long as he is a supporter of the Wilson policies 
we are determined to defeat him. We have deCided that there 
must not be another Democratic President for a generation. tt26 
Fisher claims that it was the foreign-born defection which 
hurt the Democratic Party most. He analyzes the results and 
comparison with the previouseleotion finds: 
25 
26 
•.• that the shift of votes in the 
States with a large element of 
Germans, Austrians, Italians and 
Irish is large and the shift in 
the States where such elements were 
small is small. The larger the 
foreign-born element in any State, 
the more votes gained by the 
Republican Party • 
• • • the natural react ion will ••• 
account for about half\ of the 
landslide. The mere return of 
Ibid., September 6, 1920. 
-
Ibid., September 5, 1920. 
-
the Republiean votes lost in 
1916 would aeoount for 40 per 
cent. It is significant that, 
in oomparing the different 
states, we find in general the 
larger the left shift in 1916 
the l~rger the right shift in 
1920. "( 
Many other Americans were equally willing to dispose 
31 
of Wilson and his administration. The aots of the government 
during the war were inevitably an issue in the election, and 
a legion of minor irritations inoident to it clamored for 
expression. Necessarily, too the personality of the man 
who led the nation's mighty war effort could not be kept out 
of oonsideration even though he was now retiring as an 
invalid. But aside from occasional references to Wilson's 
condition there seems to have been no effort to mitigate 
th8 storm that beat around him. On the contrary it was 
fanned as the campaign proceeded. When Governor Coolidge, 
in an address toward the close of the oampaign, expressed 
sympathy for Wilson and hope of his recovery, the !!!York 
Times considered it so notable that it asked who else had 
done likewise and added: 
When the President was first 
stricken down a year ago, and during 
the weeks when he hung between life 
and death, not a word, not a whisper 
of ooncern or condolence came from 
the Republioan Congress and since 
then the attitude of his opponents 
27 Ibid., Maroh 6 1921. 
has been one of thinly concealed 
gloating over his breakdown. 
Never have they made a 
magnanimous gesture toward 
his sickroom. 28 
When the votes were tabulated it was quite evident. 
that Cox was at the bottom of the landslide, for 16,152,220 
votes were cast for Harding to 9,471,553 for Cox. Harding 
bad sucoeeded in winning 60.35 percent of the total vote, 
the largest pe·rcentage of the total vote since 1896. The 
Democratio portion was 34.13 per cent and in no section 
32 
did its voting share sink below 24 per cent. The Republicans 
carried every state of the North and West, all the border 
states except Kentucky and Tennessee. 29 
The total vote showed an increase of eight million 
over the previous presidential election. The Democratic 
vote was almost exactly the vote of 1916, but the Republican 
vote nearly doubled, as did the "other" vote. The nineteenth 
amendmenil had been proclaimed in August 1920,_ anq; thereby 
women were entitled to vote in every state. The effect of 
women suffrage and the prohibition question on the election 
28 Ibid., October 29. 1920. 
-
29 Pres' •. vote. 21. 
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is more difficult to determine than some of the other issues. 
The fact that women were given the franchise makes the proper 
comparison of returns tor 1916 and 1920 imPossible. 30 
True it is that the returns did give Harding the 
over-whelming victory over Cox a triumph which many 
interpreted as a smashing repudiation of the "Wilson League", 
but even Calvin Coolidge, the newly elected Vice-President 
denied any such result and said soon atter the election, "I 
doubt if any particular mandate was given in the last election 
on the question of the League ot Nations •••• "3l 
So in the light ot all this evidence it seemS only 
fair to believe that the country went to the polls in 
November and voted not against the League ot Nations as the 
sole issue of repudiation but against every one ot these 
factors tor each one of them counted to Some extent, but no 
one of them had a monopoly. 
Just as the personality of Wilson dominated the war 
era, so did those of his successors set the pace of the 
period of normalcy. 
30 ~. 
31 Times, November 23, 1920. 
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As in 1920 so in 1924 the candidates were new in a 
presidential campaign. But whereas Cox and Harding had been 
in no real sense presidential candidates prior to their 
nominations, Calvin Coolidge had held the presidency since 
hiS accession upon the death of Harding in 1923, and Robert 
LaFollette, who appeared as an independent candidate in 
thiS campaign, had been an active contender for the 
Republican presidential nominations in several Republican 
conventions, notably in 1908 and in 1912. John W. Davis was 
a newcomer to the presidential race, as would have been the 
chief contenders for the Democratic nominations, William G. 
Mc Adoo and Alfred E. Smith. 
In its platform adopted at Cleveland on June 12, 1924 
the Republican Party declared strongly against the League. 
Their plank on foreign policy contained this statement: 
The Republican Party maintains the 
traditional American policy of non-
interference in the political affairs 
of other nat ions. This Government has 
definitely refused membership in the 
League of Nations and to assume any 
obligations under the covenant of the 
League. On this we stand. ,,2 
32 Cong. Rec. 69 Cong. 1 Sess., 1157. 
'5 
While the Republicans apparently were united in their 
"hands off" policy toward the League, the Demoorats found 
the League question ample ground for biokering. The 
Democratio P~y in its platform adopted at Madison Square 
Garden in July 1924 stated: 
It is of supreme importance to 
oivilization and to mankind that 
America be placed and kept on the 
right side of the greatest moral 
question of all time, and therefore, 
the Democratic Party renews its 
declaration of confidence in the 
ideal of world peace, the League of 
Nat ions and the World Court of 
Justice, as together constituting 
the supreme effort of the statesman-
ship and religious oonviction of 
our time to organize the world for 
peace .33 
This too seemed like a Simple statement of fact and 
future policy. But another plank was added at the convention 
to the Democratic Platform which caused great discord. This 
plank reaffirmed that "there is no substitute for the League 
of Nations", and urged: 
••• that the question of joining 
the. League be taken out of party 
politics by submitting it to the 
American people at a referendum 
election, advisory to the Govern-
ment, to be held offically under 
33 ~., 1071. 
act of Congress, tree from all 
other questions and candidacies, 
after ample time for full 
consideration and discu§sion 
throughout the country.,4 
On the floor of the Democratic Convention itself 
Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War in the Wilson Cabinet, 
warned the delegates that if they voted this referendum 
36 
plank in place of one frankly advocating American membership 
in the League of Nations, they would be "repudiating Woodrow 
Wilson and substituting in the Democratic Party the leadership 
of Henry Cabot Lodge". 35 
This was strong language. Even the mention of the 
name of Henry Cabot Lodge at a Democratic Convention should 
have been cause enough for trouble. But when the vote was 
taken it was 351i for Newton D. Baker's plan to 743! for the 
referendum plank. This dissension in party ranks helped none 
but the opponents. 
While the Democrats were bickering among themselves 
they of course did not forget to cast slurs at the Republicana 
They claimed that "The Republican administration has no 
foreign policy", and that it bad drifted without plan. 
34 Literary Digest, July 12, 1924, 8. 
35 ~., 10. 
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They had a remedy :for this in what they called "a sound and 
positive :foreign policy" but a more ambiguous group o:f 
statements would be di:f:ficult to :find. The Democratio 
party maintained: 
This great nation cannot af:ford 
to play a minor role in world 
politics. It must have a sound 
and positive :foreign polioy, not 
a negative one. We declare :for 
a oonstructive :foreign polioy based 
on these prinoiples:. 
(a) Outlawry o:f war and an abhorrence 
o:f militarism, conquest and 
imperialism. 
(b) Freedom :from entangling political 
allianoes with :foreign nations • 
•••• (g) Full, :free and open oooperation 
with all other nations :for the 
promotion o:f peace and justioe 
throughout the world. 
(h) In our :foreign relations, this 
country should stand as a unit, 
and to be success:ful, :foreign 
policies must have the approval 36 
and support o:f the American people. 
Evidently the Republicans were to stand on their record 
and so in the preamble to the party plat:form we :find this 
statement: 
36 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1924 
Campaign - ~ Analysis, Richard R. Smith, New-VOrx;-I927, 
159. 
The Republican Party in national 
convention assembled presents to 
the people of the Nation this 
platform of its principles, based 
on a record of its accomplishments, 
and asks and awaits a new vote of 
confidence. We reaffirm our 
devotion to the Constitution of 
the United States and the principles 
and institutions of the American 
system of representative govern-
ment.37 
38 
Of course it is indeterminable how many people ever 
read this platform and it is also doubtful how many would 
after having read it voted to reelect the Republicans on the 
basis of accomplishments. It has been said by many that the 
Coolidge landslide of 1924 was a personal victory and that 
the Republican Party did not win the election but the 
personality of Coolidge did. 38 Not that he was such an 
outstanding personality but the people were won over by his 
"calm, judicial ways", and his "simple homely virtues".39 
This was a clear-cut statement of policy and it appeared as 
though in this election there was to be no doubt or 
straddling of the League plank. In fact there was hardly a 
League plank that could be considered as such. Though the 
37 Ibid., 129. 
-
38 Hugh L. Keenleyside, "The American Political 
Revolution of 1924", Current History, V. 21, March 1925, 25. 
39 Literary Digest, July 12, 1924, 7. 
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Republioans oame out firmly against the United States joining 
tbe League still ~hey were not against oooperating with the 
League in some of its endeavors. Their platform provided 
for just this. 
In aooordanoe, however, with 
with the long-established Amerioan 
praotioe of giving aid and assistance 
to other peoples, we have most usefully 
assisted by oooperation in the 
humanitarian and teohnioal works under-
taken by the i-eague, without involving 
ourselves in European golitios by 
acoepting membership.4 
In this platform we also find a rather slight reference of 
endorsement of the World Court • 
•••• the Republican Party pledges 
itself to aid and assist in the 
perfeotion of prinoiples of 
international law and the 
settlement of international 
disputes. 4l 
When the caapaign is reviewed we find that in the July 
Convention the Democrats lost their real opport~ity. In the 
animosities and biokering in this oonvention we find the 
party disunited and divided. Though John W. Davis was 
intelleotually one of the most eminent oandidates who ever 
40 .!EJ4. 
41 Ibid. 
-
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aspired to the White House he was unable to unite and 
revitalize a disorganized and faction-rent Democratic Party. 
This is reflected in bold contrast to the Republican campaign 
which was excellently managed both politically and 
financially. 
Actually the League was not considered a real issue in 
this election. The Republicans, as we bave seen absolutely 
refused any relation to the League and the Democrats were 
divided and disunited on their League policy. Some held t 
Wilson and his poli·oies in such high regard that it amounted 
to almost religious fervor and to alter their policy toward 
the League would, to them, mean total repudiation of Wilson 
and all for which he stood. Others in the Democratic Party 
evaded the League as a party issue and declined to carry 
the League as a dominant policy.42 
Many cartoons depicted the Democratic Party evading the 
League question and refusing to carry the "millstone of the 
League" through the campaign. 43 
42 ~., 6-8. 
43 ~., 11. 
qa 
U .itd U J ii21Jt iild .... 
41 
Thus we find the campaign that ended in the re-election 
of Calvin Coolidge was remarkable in no way except for the 
existence of a third party which made a substantial showing. 
Coolidge received ••••••• 
Davis received ••••••••• 
La Follette received ••• 
Scattered vote of •••••• 
15,729,060 
8,391,431 
4,820,758 
164,634 
Total vote cast •••.••.• 29,105,883 
44 
The number of eligible voters was 56,925,000, which 
showed that 51.1% of the eligible voters cast their ballots. 
This total was raised by the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment which extended the franchise to more than 
25,000,000 politically inexperienced women. 45 
Politically the scene was very much as usual. There 
was a comparative lack of well-defined issues and a general 
apathy and detachment on the part of a large percentage of 
citizens was evident. Prosperity, Prohibition, and 
Prejudice, -these three were the real issues of the campaign 
of 1928 and in reading the campaign literature of the day we 
see that foreign policy was curiously inert as an issue. 
44 Keenleyside, 36. 
45 Ibid., 38. 
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The candidates nominated in the Democratic convention 
held in Houston, Texas were Alfred E. Smith, and 'Joseph T. 
Robinson. The Republicans were pinning their hopes on Herbert 
Clark Hoover; and Charles E. Curtis. Both of the presidential 
candidates had been widely known as potential candidates long 
before the campaign of 1928 opened, and both were generally 
regarded as possessing outstanding leadership. 
Four years previously Al Smtth had been hailed as the 
eighth wonder of the world becauseof his tremendous victory 
in the gubernatorial election in New York State. He was 
elected by a majority of 115,000 votes and in that election 
of 1924 was the only Democrat elected in the state. He also 
held the distinction of being the only governor to be elected 
to Albany for three terms in nearly a century.46 
Hoover's accomplishments were many. He was Belgian 
Relief Commissioner, Food Administrator, and Secretary of 
Commerce under President Harding and the Republicans exalted 
themselves by declaiming upon his greater fitness, by 
training, travel and temperament for the administration of 
world affairs. 47 
46 Literarl Digest, November 15, 1924, 9. 
47 Ibid., July 21, 1928, 6-8. 
43 
Seldom has this been the oase of both contenders in a 
presidential eleotion. This in itself led to the expectation 
of a great vote. However, eaoh candidate faoed serious 
discontent within his party and neither oandidate had the 
wholehearted support of the party organization. 
No mention is made of the League of Nations in either 
the Demooratio or the Republioan Party Platform. The 
Democratio Platform as adopted on June 29, 1928, showed that 
the party still revered Wilson and his ideals as evidenced 
in this exoerpt: 
We the Demooratio Party in 
oonvention assembled, pause to pay 
our tribute of love and respeot to 
the memory of him who in his life and 
in his offioial aotions voioed the 
hopes and aspirations of all good men 
and women of every raoe and olime, 
the former President of the United 
States, Woodrow Wilson. His spirit 
moves on and his example and deeds 
will exalt those who oome after us 
as they have inspired us. 
We are grateful that we were 
privileged to work with him and again 
pay tribute to his high ideals and 
aooomplishments. 48 
Nothing tangible was made of the League as a oampaign 
issue rather the people were more oonoerned with issues suoh 
48 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, ~ 1928 Campaign ~ 4nalysis, Riohard R. Smith, New York, 1931, 129-143. 
as the following: 
We hold that government must 
funotion not to oentralize our wealth 
but to preserve equal opportunity so 
that all may share in our prioeless 
resouroes, and not oonfine prosperity 
to a favored few. We, therefore, pledge 
the Demooratic Party to enoourge 
business, sma·ll and great alike; to 
conserve human happiness and liberty; 
to break the shaokles of monoply and 
free the business of the nation; to 
respond to popular Will.4~ 
On eleotion day, November 6, 1928, Herbert Hoover 
oarried forty states inoluding four states of the "solid 
South". Governor Smith's popular vote of 15,005,497 to 
21,429,109 for Hoover showed that he was stronger than 
either Davis in 1924 or Cox in 1920. 50 Still, Smith lost 
44 
his own state, where for the first time he ran behind his 
tioket, which inoluded the viotorious Democratic candidate for 
governor and United States senator, respectively, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Dr. Royal S. Copeland. 
In the oampaigns of 1932 and 1936 the League of Nations 
ceased to be an issue. The Amerioan people were concerned 
more with domestic issues than with international policies. 
Two rather formidable problems oonfronted the presidential 
49 Ibid., 129. 
50 Pres. vote, 26. 
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aspirants they were, prohibition and the depression. 
In the 1932 campaign we find both parties, Democratic 
as well as Republican, paying "verbal homage to certain 
phases of internationalism", but not including the League 
of Nations in these utterances. Both parties asked that 
the United States join the World Court and both favored 
consultation with other governments in case of threatened 
violation of the anti-war pact. While the Democrats did 
not even mention the League, the Republican platform did 
take satisfaction in the fact that during the Sino-Japanese 
dispute the United States did act in harmony with the 
government represented in the League of Nations. 
This is the only mention of the League, as such, to be 
found in either platform. 5l There was slight divergence of 
policies between the party platforms and really the great 
difference between the two platforms, apart from the 
contrast on prohibition related to their divergenoe on 
economic problems. In fact, many claimed that the parties 
were so in accord in this campaign that, It ••• essent ially the 
issue is a choice between a conservative and a progressive 
standard-bearer. 1t52 
51 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1932 
Campaign-An Analysis, Farrar and Rinehart, Ino. , lreWYork, 
1935, 136. 
Roosevelt was the more 'progressive of the major 
candidates. He, even during the oampaign, was looked upon 
8S a man of action. From the day of his nomination at 
Ohicago he showed his tradition-shattering teohnique. For 
it was the first time in our history that a presidential 
candidate flew to the convention to aooept the nomination 
of his party and to deliver his own acceptanoe speech. 53 
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Early in the campaign Governor Roosevelt set the pace 
of the oampaign and presented the issues. By declaring, 
"Your oandidate wants repeal ••• from this date on the 
Eighteenth Amendment is doomed," he stated flatly his po1ioy 
on prohibition. 54 
In Roosevelt's op.inion, because of the existing 
oonditions, the depression was to take first p1aoe. He 
deo1ared: 
••• it is inevitable that the main 
issue of this oampi ign should 
revolve about the olear faot of our 
economio oondition, a depression so 
deep, that it is without precedent 
in modern history.55 
53 Ibid., 2, also 1932 Campaign, 214. 
54 Ibid., 4. 
55 !M4. 
Again at Salem, Massachusetts Governor Roosevelt 
proved that the depression was the dominant issue in the 
campaign. In addressing the Democrats in the Boston Arena 
he said: 
I Wish I could stay to see the 
burning of the Witch of depression, 
but that is impossible. The witch 
of depres~ion will be buried ten 
feet puder ground after March 4, 
next.'o 
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The whole atmosphere of the campaign showed that the 
depression not the League was upper most in the minds of the 
people. Banners, speeches, parades, are evidence of this. 
In Boston a banner proclaimed: "Let's Greet 1933 With 
Roosevelt and Prosperity", another declared "12,000,000 
Unemployed Want Jobs."57 
At this time Roosevelt seemed to b e the answer to what 
the people wanted - a leader to take them out of the depths 
of the depression. The election results are evidence of this, 
and are almost exactly the reverse of the election of 1928. 
Roosevelt obtained 22,815,539 votes to Hoover's 15,759,930 
a plurality of 7,055,609 for Roosevelt.58 
56 Times, November 1, 1932. 
57 ~. 
58 1932 Campaign, 215. 
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At the beginning of his inauguration speech Mr. 
Roosevelt stressed the need of leadership and briefly 
characterized the distressed conditions of the country but 
again no mention was made of the League. 59 In this 
inauguration speech the President did give hope and did relie 
to some extent, the distraught nation by proclaiming in that 
noW famous utterance, " ••• the only thing we have to fear is 
fear itself. "60 
At the Democratic and Republican conventions in the 
summer of 1936 we find slight mention of the League and this 
in opposition. The Republicans, in their platform were at 
least rather consistent in their opposition for they 
maintained in the plank on foreign affairs that: 
America shall not become a member 
of the League of Nations nor of the 
World Court nor shall America take 
on any entanglin§la11iances in 
foreign affairs. 
The keynote of President Roosevelt's acceptance speech 
was the continuation of the New Deal. The Democrats in this 
convention, in Philadelphia, went on record to: 
59 Literary Digest, March 11, 1935, 5. 
60 Ibid., 7. 
61 Ibid., July 4, 1936, 5. 
, 
.; 1 
Extend the poliCY of the good 
ne ighbor. . •• Guard against be ing 
drawn, by political commitments, 
international banking6~r private 
trading into any war. 
The foreign policy formulated at this convention contained 
not a word concerning the League. It proposed: 
••• no interference with the affairs 
of other nations •••• We seek only by 
force of our own example to spread 
the gospel of peace in the world •••. 
Our closest neighbors are good 
neighbors. If there are remoter 
nations that wish us not good but 
ill, they know th~t we can and will 
defend ourselves. , 
62 Ibid. 
-
63 Ibid., November 14, 1936, 11. 
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CHAPTER III 
EFFORTS TO INDUCE NATION TO JOIN WORLD COURT 
A Permanent Court of 
International Justice is hereby 
established, in accordance with 
Article 14 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. l 
By this statute prospects opened which permitted the 
future of the Permanent Court of the Int-ernational Justice 
to be acted upon officially by the United states. 
It was hoped that -consideration in the United states of 
this World Court would be deliberated upon without regard 
to some of the preoccupations that beclouded United States 
membership in the League of Nations. As we are to observe, 
this was not possible for the alignments resulting from the 
disagreements over the League were still evident and active. 
On February 17, 1923 Secretary of state Hughes sent a 
letter to President Harding recommending that the Senate be 
aSked for advice on, and oonsent to, the United States' 
adhesion to the Protocol of December 16, 1920. President 
1 "Statute for the Permanent Court of International 
Justice", The United States ~ ~ Permanent Court ~ 
International Justice, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1930, 19. 
o 
; a iii! 
Harding acted accordingly and sent the letter and a message 
to the Senate on February 24, 1923. 
In his message the President cited the fact that a 
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court was functioning at The Hague in Which the United States 
was able to bring suit, but he considered that not enough for 
a nation which had long been committed to the peaceful 
settlement of international controversies. He asked the 
Senate for approval of adhesion to the protocol, because by 
Hughes reservations we could remain free from any legal 
relation or assumption of obligation under the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. He believed that these conditions would 
be acceptable to the great nations, although nothing could be 
done until the United states offered to adhere to these 
reservations. The executive had no authority to make this 
offer until the Senate gave its approval and he therefore 
urged their "favorable advice and consent".2 
In his letter dated February 17, 1923, which accompanied 
the President's message, Secretary Hughes, before stating 
his present plans, reviewed the active part which the United 
states had taken in judicial settlement of international 
disputes. He stated: 
2 Cong. Rec., v.64, pt.5, 4498. 
Prior to the First Peace 
Conference at the Hague in 
1899 the United States had 
participated in fifty-seven 
arbitrations •••• The President ••• 
in the past, had acted as 
arbitrator between other 
nations in five cases; 
ministers of the United States, 
or others chosen by the United 
States, had acted as arbitrators 
or umpires in seven cases.' 
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In recalling the part the United States had, in former 
times, played as a peacemaker or at an attempt at being a 
peaoemaker the Secretary referred to the instructions 
Secretary Hay had given the delegates to the First Peaoe 
Conference. Seoretary Hay instruoted: 
Nothing oan seoure for human 
government and for the authority of 
law whioh it represents so deep a 
respeot and so firm a loyalty as the 
speotacle of sovereign and independent 
States whose duty it is to presoribe 
the rules of justice and impose 
penalties upon the lawless, bowing 
with reference before august 
supremaoy of those principles of 
right whioh give th~ law its 
eternal foundation. 4 
A plan for a permanent international tribunal aocompanie 
these instruotions. It was at this oonference that the 
Permanent Court of International Justice was established. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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However this organization while called "a permanent court 
really consisted of an eligible list of persons designated by 
the contracting parties" from which tribunals might be 
constituted. 5 Secretary Hughes proceeded to reassure the 
President that this was not a new or unpopular problem. 
He asserted: 
••• that the preponderant opinion in 
this country has not only favored the 
policy of judicial settlement of 
,just.icia'ble internat ional disputes 
through arbitral tribunals specially 
established, but it has also strongly 
desired that a Permanent Court of 
International Justice Shoulg be 
established and maintained. 
Referring to the last phase of the Court's growth 
Hughes mentioned the relation the League of Nations had to 
the present proposed plan. 
5 
6 
The covenant of the League of 
Nations provided, in article 14, that 
the council of the league should 
formulate and submit to the members of 
the league plans for the establishment 
of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice Which should be competent to 
hear and determine any dispute of an 
international character which the 
parties thereto should submit to it 
and which might also give an advisory 
Ibid. 
-
Ibid. 
opinion upon any dispute or 
question referred to it by the 
councilor by the assembly of the 
League. This provision of the 
covenant, it may be said, entered 
into the subsequent controversy with 
respect to participation by this 
Government in the League of Nat ions; 
on the contrary it is believed that 
this controversy reflected but little, 
if any, divergence of view in this 
country in respect to the advisability 
of establishing a permanent court of 
international justice.·r 
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In the folloWing words the Secretary of state determined 
to show the distinction that the Permanent Court was not 
made effective by the Assembly of the League but rather by 
a separate protocol. He no doubt realized that any connection 
whatsoever with the League would be oonsidered detrimental to 
the Court and wanted to emphasize this distinction. 
The council of the league 
appointed an advisory committee of jurists •••• It recommended a plan ••• 
and after -certain amendments had 
been made, the statute constituting 
the Permanent Court of International 
Justice was adopted by the assembly 
of the league on December 13, 1920. 
Though these steps were taken 
under the auspices of the league the 
statute constituting the Permanent 
Court of International Justice did 
7 Ibid. 
not become effective upon its 
adoption by the assembly of the 
league. On the contrary, it 
became effective by virtue of 
the signature and ratification 
by the signatory powers of a 
special protocol. The reason 
for this procedure was that 
although the plan of the court 
was prepared under article 14 
of the covenant, the statute 
went beyond the terms of the 
court, especially in making the 
court available to States which 
were not members of the League 
of Nations. Accordingly a 
protocol of signature was prepared 
by which the Signatory powers 
declared their acceptance of the 
adjoined statute of the PermaneHt 
Court of International Justice. 
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In ord~r to presage any unsurmontable difficulty, if 
the relation of the Court to the League should prove a 
stumbling block in so far as involving the United States in 
any legal obligation under the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, Hughes advised that if this presented any question 
that this point should be distinctly referred to as a part 
of the terms of adhesion on the part of the United States. 
He recommended to the President that if this plan as 
outlined should meet with his approval he advised the 
8 Ibid. 
-
president to request the Senate to take suitable action 
toward the adhesion of the United States to the protocol of 
December 16, 1920 accepting the adjoined statute of the 
permanent Court of Justice and rejecting the optional clause 
for compulsory jurisdiction. 
Secretary Hughes also recommended that the terms should 
be based upon the following conditions which were to be made 
a part of the instrument of adhesion. He set forth his four 
reservations in these words which in the succeeding debates 
over the question of adhesion were to become famous and 
referred to as the "Hughes reservations". 
I. That such adhesion shall not 
be taken to involve any relation 
on the part of the United states 
to the League of Nations or the 
assumption of any obligation by 
the United States under the covenant 
of the League of Nations constituting 
Part I of the Treaty of Versailles. 
II That the United States shall be 
permitted to participate through 
representatives deSignated for 
the purpose and upon an equality 
with the other States members 
respectively of the council and 
assembly of the League of Nations 
in any and all proceedings of 
either the councilor the assembly 
for the election of judges or 
deputy judges of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice or 
for the filling of vacancies. 
III That the United states will pay 
a fair share of the expenses of 
the Court as det ermined and 
appropriated from time to time. 
IV That the statute of Pennanent 
Court of International Justice 
adjoined to the protocol shall 
not be amended without the 
consent of the United State s • 9 
Since this message of the President to the Senate on 
February 24, 1923 pertained to a treaty or protocol with 
foreign governments, it was read behind closed doors~ 
Hughes' letter was not read. According to one report there 
were few Senators present as the business of the day was 
practically over. Upon a motion of Senator Lodge, the 
message and accompanying letter of Secretary Hughes were 
referred to the Committee on Poreign Relations. 10 
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On February 27 , . this Senate Committee adopted a 
resolution offered by Senator Borah calling on Harding for 
further infonnation about his proposal. It was generally 
understood that this procedure was a move for delay intended 
to give the committee an excuse for not passing on the 
World Court question during that session. ll 
9 Ibid. 
10 "President Harding's Plea for the World Court", 
Current History, The New York Times Co., N.Y., v. 18, 39. 
11 Ibid. 
On the previous day, Senator King of Utah, introduced 
senate Resolution 454, which embodied the four reservations 
recommended by Secretary Hughes. It was laid upon the 
table until the next day.l2 
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It was hardly expected in the short time which remained 
before Congress adjourned that the Senate would be able to 
sanction the President'e suggeetions. l3 Some believed that 
the President was clever to make the proposal at this late 
date in the session with the idea of getting it before the 
country so there would be sufficient time for the people to 
consider it during the months of the Congressional recess. l4 
At first thought it appeared that if the President had 
really been interested in this legislation and earnestly 
wished its passage he had made a grave mistake in timing 
by sending his message to Congress in the clOSing days of a 
busy session when aotion on so serious a question was 
practioally impossible. However more serious students of 
the Situation readily considered it a very fine pieoe of 
timing. By asking the Senate to consider the Court question 
12 Congo ~., v 64, pt.5, 4632. 
13 Times, February 25, 1923. 
14 Ibid., February 26, 1923. 
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the President had put the issue before the American people, 
to be talked of all summer, to be the subject of Presidential 
and other utterances on the platform and to c reate a public 
sentiment bound to have a decisive influence on the members 
of the new Congress. It was to prove a topic of lively 
discussion with Johnson, Borah, and other anti-League 
Senators against the plan, and the President for it. 
Political commentators forecasted that the discussions would 
continue on into the next Republican convention. Mark 
Sullivan thought that it was more than likely that the 
World Court question "may have the same relation to the 
campaign of 1924 that the League of Nations had to the 
of 1920. tl15 ~ ~ York .Times, observed that the Harding 
Hughes plan for membership ,in the World Court received" ••• 
a spontaneous and remarkable approval by the press, 
irrespective of party and the endorsement of many Americans 
of light and leading. n16 
Again on March 5, 1923 President Harding reiterated 
his proposal in a letter to Lieutenant-Governor Bloom of 
Ohio by declaring that, tt it is inoonoeivable to me that the 
15 Ibid., February 25, 1923. 
16 Ibid., February 26, 1923. 
-
American people who have long been devoted to this ideal, 
should refuse their adherenoe now to suoh a program as is 
represented by this tribuna1."17 The faot that this letter 
waS given rather widespread attention and publicity was 
regarded as indicative of the faot that the President was 
determined in the nine months of the Congressional recess 
to keep his proposal before the American peop1e. 18 
President Harding's first pub1io address dealing with 
our entrance in the World Court was delivered the following 
month on April 24, 1923, bef0re the Assooiated Press, in 
New York. 
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What better o~~siQn; could be asked to get this 
before the American people than to present it to the press 
of the nation? On this ocoasion the President admitted that 
some observers of the national scene claimed that our 
adherenoe to the Court was a move toward becoming a member 
in the League of Nations, but he wanted to assure any so 
thinking that there was no such thought among those offioials 
who shaped American foreign policy. Still others said that 
entanglements with the League would be unavoidable. But 
any relationship With the League would have required the 
17 Current History, v.18, 34. 
18 rug,., 39. 
. ; 
assent of the Senate, and this was not to be feared. But 
if by some chance the Senate approved of such action, 
Barding promised that his administration would not complete 
the ratification. The President pointed out that there was 
only one political bugbear in the fact that in the Assembly 
of the League the British Empire had six votes in that 
branch of the Court electorate of the Council. In view of 
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.the fact that no nation could have more than one judge it 
seemed less formidable in the Court than when applied to the 
League. Furthermore, if other nations accepted this voting 
strength of the British dominions, we too should have done so 
in view of the natural ties of the English speaking race. 
Finally Harding commended our adhesion to the Court as a great 
step in the direction of peaceful settlement of justiciable 
questions. 19 
On his trip to Alaska in the summer of 1923 President 
Harding stopped in St. Louis and on June 21 spoke about the 
Court, laying down two conditions Which he considered 
indispensable to our acceptance. These were: 
19 Congressional D~st, A. Gram Robinson and 
Norborne T. N. Robinson, blishers,' 1923, v. 2, 232-233. 
1. That the tribunal should be 
in theory and practice a World 
Court and not a League Court. 
2. That the United States should 
occupy a plane of perfect 
equali~O with every other 
power. 
He further stated: 
There admittedly is a League connection 
with the World Court though I firmly 
believe we could adhere to the Court 
Protocol, With becoming reservations, 
and be free from every possible 
obligation to the League, I would 
frankly prefer the Court's independence 
of the League. 2 
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Harding went on to praise the Court as it was 
constituted, but suggested that it be made self perpetuating 
in one of two ways: 
1. By empowering the Court to fill 
any vacancy which arose from the 
death or retirement of a member 
without interposition from any 
other body. 
2. By transferring the power of 
electors from the Council and 
the Assembly to the remaining 
members of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice so that 
in fact the Court's member§ 
elected their 8uccessors.22 
20 !lli., 55. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Literary Digest, July 14, 1923, 9. 
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Therefore from these statements of President Harding 
~ can see that his policy was characterized by patience. 
HiS tactics were those of patience and not forcefulness. 
Barding did not attempt to force his proposal through Congress 
by legislative manipulation or executiv~ pressure. In 
considering this policy we must remember that Harding was 
a candidate for re-eleotion when this question was brought to 
the fore. It probably would not have been too wise for the 
President to attempt foroe or to try to impose hiS will upon 
the Senate. His polioy was also interpreted by some who 
thought that he would have oonsidered oonditions other than 
the Hughes reservations under which the United States might 
adhere to the Court because he had put forth suggestions of 
other possibilities. They thought this was likely to win 
over both the Senate and publio opinion. 23 
In poor health and oppressed by the oharges already 
made against his administration, Harding oontinued on to 
Alaska where he fell seriously ill. On the return trip he 
died, at San Franoisoo, August 2, 1923. Shortly before his 
death an address on foreigb affairs, whioh he had prepared 
to deliver in San Franoisoo was published. 
23 ~., 8. 
attempted to justify the attitude of his administration 
toward the League as follows: 
If our people are ever to decide 
upon war they will chose to decide 
according to our own national conscience 
at the time and in the constitutional 
manner without advance commitment, or 
the advice and consent of any power. 
To revive the old controversy in 
any phase would have been disastrous. 
We do not challenge the utility of 
the League of Nations to others; we 
wish it more power in every 
righteous exercise of its functions; 
but it is clearly not for us as 
presented in the Versailles Covenant. 24 
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He confirmed the wisdom of the Senate in opposing the League, 
and continued: 
~ 
Out of the inevitable Presidential 
contacts with the World War's havoc 
and destruction and the measureless 
sorrows which attended and has followed, 
I would be insensible to duty and 
violate all sentiments of my heart 
and all my oonviotions if I failed to 
urge Amerioan support of the 
Permanent Court of International 
Justice. I do not know that such a 
oourt will be unfailing in the 
avoidance of war, but I know it is 
a step in the right direction. 25 
These final words of Harding's left the issue sharply outlined 
for his suocessor, Calvin Coolidge. 
24 !!:! York Tribune, August 1, 1923. 
25 Ibid. 
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The World Court issue must have been foremost in the 
minds of the Amerioan people, at least in the mind of the 
president, for in his first official address to Congress 
president Coolidge dealt with the entrance of the United 
States to the Court. The first statement of his policy took 
form in his message to Congress on December 6, 1923. After 
paying due respect to the late President, Coolidge said: 
Our foreign policy has always been 
guided by two principles. The one 
is the avoidanoe of permanent 
political alliances which would 
sacrifice our proper independence. 
The other is the peaceful settlement 
of oontroversies between nations. 26 
Like Hughes, Coolidge too harkened back to the Hague 
Tribunal and also gave a ahort history of our attempts and 
efforts toward entrance in a permanent international oourt. 
He favored our entrance and stated: 
By example and by treaty we have 
advocated arbitration. For nearly 
twenty-five years we have been a 
member of the Hague !ribunal, and 
have sought the creat ion of a 
permanent world court of justice. 
I am in full accord with both of 
these polioies. I favor the 
establishment of such a court 
intended to inolude the whole world. 
That is and has been an American 
policy.27 
26 Qrulg. Rec., v.o5, pt. 1, 96-97. 
Ibid. 
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Continuing his message to Congress President Coolidge 
dealt with the present plan for a world court by stating that 
thiS plan with the Hughes reservations was not perfect but 
that it was workable and he would like to see the Senate aet 
favorable. He continued by declaring: 
Pending before the Senate is a 
proposal that this Government give its 
support to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, which is a new 
and somewhat different plan. ThiS is 
not a partisan question. It should 
not assume an artificial importance. 
The court is merely a convenient 
instrument of adjustment to which 
we could go, but to which we could 
not be brought. It should be discussed 
in entire candor, not by a political, 
but a judicial method without pressure 
and without prejudice. Partisanship 
has no place in our foreign relations. 
As I wish to see a court established, 
and as the proposal presents the only 
practical plan on which many nations 
have agreed, though it may not meet 
every desire. I therefore commend it to 
the favorable consideration of the 
Senate, with the proposed reservations 
clearly indicating our refusal tQ 
adhere to the League of Nations. 28 
By this statement we see that the President recognized 
that the Senate had delayed in its deliberations of the 
Court and intimated that because partisan policies had 
28 !bid., 97. 
crept into the discussions other considerations had taken 
precedence over it. He considered our adherence to the 
Court necessary but he emphasized that it had grown out of 
proportion to its importance and he wished it placed in its 
proper setting. 
67 
Four days later on December 10, 1923 Senator King of 
Utah, introduced a resolution which called for United States 
adherence to the World Court, with the exception of the 
compulsory jurisdiction clause under the Harding-Hughes 
reservations. It was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. 29 
That same day Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin offered a 
resolution to the Senate which called for adherence to the 
Protocol of the Court under certain conditions. This too 
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. This 
included the usual clause found in these resolutions of 
adhesion to the Protocol. The same fear was expressed 
concerning the refusal of the United States to enter the 
League of Nations or assume any obligations under the League. 
In this resolution it was so phrased: 
29 Ibid., 153. 
That such adherence shall not be taken 
to involve any legal relationship on 
the part of the United States to the 
League of Nations, or the assumption 
of any obligations by the United States 
under the covenant of the League of 
Nations, constitutisg a part of the 
Versailles treaty.' 
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President Coolidge, in a MemoniaJ Day address in 1924, 
said that the Barding proposal had already been approved by 
him. He did not oppose the other reservation, but felt that 
any material changes would probably not receive the consent 
of the nations and for that reason would be impractical. 
He thought that the United States could not take such a 
step without assuming certain obligations and surrendering 
something. But the situation had to be faced and an 
ambiguous position would accomplish nothing. The fear of 
entanglement with the League seemed unlikely to President 
Coolidge with the Hughes reservations. He thought that 
the United States should sustain a Court which it had 
advocated for years. 3l 
30 ~., 151. 
31 Outlook, Outlook Co., N.Y., 1924, June 11, 1924, 
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In his annual message to Congress, on December 3, 1924, 
Fresident Coolidge declared: 
I believe it would 'be for the 
advantage of this country and helpful 
to the stability of other nations for 
us to adhere to the Protocol 
establishing that Court upon the 
conditions stated in the recom-
mendation which is now before the 
Senate, and further that our country 
shall not be bound by advisory 
opinion whi.ch may be rendered by 
the Court upon questions which we have 
not voluntarily submitted for its judgement. This Court would 'provide 
a practical and oonvenient tribunal 
before which we could go voluntarily, 
but to whioh we could not bes~Qned, 
for a determination of ~;ustipi~ble 
questions when they fail to be 
resolved by diplomatio negotiations.32 
Even the House of' Representatives was beooming 
impatient with the pondering of the Court question in the 
Committee of Foreign Relations, the Suboommittee Hearings, 
and in the Senate as evidenced by this Resolution adopted by 
the House, March 3, 1925. 
Resolved, That the House of 
Representatives desires to express 
its cordial approval of the said 
Court and an earnest deSire that 
32 Cong. ~., v.66, pt. 1, 55. 
the United States give early 
adherence to the Protocol establishing 
the same, with the reservations 
reoommended by President Harding and 
President Coolidge. 
Resolved further, That the House 
expresses its readiness to 
partioipate in the enaotment of 
suoh legislation as will 
neoessarily follow suoh approval. 33 
On the folloWing day President Coolidge oame out om e 
again for the World Court. He said: 
In conformity with the principle 
that display of reason rather than 
a threat of foroe should be the 
determiJljtlK, faotor in the inter-
oourse between nations we have long 
advooated the peaceful settlement 
of disputes by methods of arbitration 
and have negotiated many treaties to 
secure that result. The same conditions 
should lead to our adherence to the 
Permanent Court of International 
Justioe.'4 
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Not being as vociferous as Some of his predeoessors or 
as some of his successors in the office of President we are 
foroed to rely on his official utterances on traditional 
oooasions. In his annual message to Congress on December 8, 
1925 he reminded the Senators that the proposal to adhere 
33 Ibid., 5404-5. 
34 Ibid., v.66, pt. 5, 56-58. 
to the Court had been pending before the Senate for nearly 
t~e years although the United States had taken a leading 
part in laying the foundation on which this institution 
rested.35 
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In Senate Resolution 5 of January 27, 1926 another 
reservation was added to those recommended by Secretary 
Hughes in his letter of February 17, 1923. It took just 
three years for the Senate to get this far. This resolution 
stated: 
Resolved (two-thirds of the 
Senators present concurring), That the 
Senate advise and consent to the 
adherence on the part of the United 
States to the said protocol of 
December 16, 1920, and the adjoining 
Statute for the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (without 
accepting or agreeing to the optional 
clause for compulsory jurisdiction 
contained in said Statute), and that 
the Signature of the United States 
be affixed to the said protocol, 
subject to the following reservations 
and understandingS, which are hereby 
made a part an~6condition of thiS 
resolution •••• 
35 Ibid., v. 60, pt.l, 459. 
36 ~. ~ P,C.I.J., 31-32. 
14 X .; j jUt SCSU 
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The following reservation incorporated in this 
resolution proved to be the famous stumbling-block to American 
adherence to the Court. It declared: 
That the Court shall not render any 
advisory opinion except publicly after 
due notice to all states adhering to 
the Court and to all interested states 
and after public hearing or opportunity 
for hearing given to any state, 
concerned; nor shall it, without the 
consent of the United States, entertain 
any request for an advisory opinion 
touching any dispute or question in 
which the3United states has or claims an interest. 7 
Apparently this would seem that the United States was 
sincere in its intentions of adherence to the protocol. 
The Senate resolution of adherence with reservations and 
understanding, was promptly transmitted by the Secretary of 
State to each of the forty-eight member States. On September 
1, 1926, these states met in a conference called at Geneva, 
to consider the American proposals and ultimately agreed upon 
a plan for accepting the Senate reservations, leaving the 
door open for further discussion and explanation if necessary. 
The reply was communicated to the United states, but the State 
Department made no offiCial reply. The announcement that the 
37 Ibid. 
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report was unacceptable to the American government was made 
bY president Coolidge in his Armistice Day speech. The 
president in discussing the Court noted the fact that no 
final answers had been recemved from the signatory powers, 
but with the situation as it was then, he felt that he could 
not ask the Senate to modify its position. Furthermore, 
unless the Senate proposals were met by the members of the 
Court he saw no prospect of the United States joining the 
tribunal. 38 
Hearst, Borah, the Chicago Tribune and others opposed 
to the Court interpreted the President's address as 
acceptance of defeat and as total defeat for the Court, but 
as another administration passed on, the question of American 
adherence to the World Court was a legacy presented for 
solution to the Hoover administration. 
Herbert Hoover, in his inaugural address of March 4, 
1929 gave strong support to another approach to the Court. 
He explained that the reservations sought no special privilege 
for us but only clarification of our relation to advisory 
opinions. The new President stressed the fact that: 
38 International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, New York, !~27, No.232, 360. 
The Permanent Court of 
International Justice is particularly 
identified with American ideals and 
with American statesmanship •••• The 
way should and I believe will, be 
found by which we may take our prope r 
place in a movement so fugdamental 
to the progress of peace.,9 
At this point in the development of the World Court 
in the United States attention was focused on Elihu Root who 
had gone to Geneva to work out a plan that would prove 
satisfactory to the Senate and also to the World Court 
signatories. It was indeed, a monumental task. 
Root's formula attempted to solve the deadlock between 
the two. His plan was a compromise. He reaffirmed the 
Senate's claim to a veto over advisory opinions and then 
set up rules governing the exeroise of this veto power. 
The United States was to be notified of every request for 
an advisory opinion and discussion was to be invited. If 
this discussion should disclose: 
(l) that no agreement can be reached 
as to whether the question does touch 
an interest of the United States within 
the true meaning of the second paragraph 
of this article; and 
/39 Literary Digest, March 16, 1929, 7. 
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(2) that submission o~ the question 
is still insisted upon a~er 
attributing to the objeotion of the 
United States the same foroe and 
effeot as attaohes to a vote 
against asking for the opinion given 
by a member of the League of Nations 
either in Assembly or Counoil; and 
if it also appears that the United 
States has not been able to find 
the submission of the question so 
important for the general good as to 
oall upon the United States to forego 
its objeot10n, in that particular 
instanoe leaving the request to be 
acted upon by the Court without in 
any way binding the United States; 
then it shall be deemed that owing 
to material difference of view 
regarding the proper soope or 
praotice of requesting advisory 
opinions, the arrangement now agreed 
upon is not yielding satisfactory 
results, and that exeroise of powers 
of wi thdray@l provided in Art icle XII 
hereof will follow naturally without 
any imputation of unfriendliness or 
unwillingness to co-operate generally 
for peaoe and good W1l1. 40 
Root doubted that it would ever be neoessary to put 
this solution into use but if this plan was ever put into 
practice he felt that it would result in agreement in any 
such dispute. In explaining his plan to the Commission 
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set by the Oouncil to deal with the question o~ American 
adherence he quite frankly told them this and added that he 
believed the apprehension aroused in Washington and in 
40 Times, March 7, 1929. 
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Geneva to be unfounded but that this had to be guarded 
against and he felt this was the way. This plan was adopted 
by the Commission with slight modification made by Sir Cecil 
Hurst •41 
It seemed that this was the real solution to the Court 
question concerning the United States and that surely when 
given another chance the Senate would indubitably consent to 
adherence but the catalytio agent oame too late. By the time 
the World Court protocols bad been signed by the foreign 
nations concerned the prosperity bubble had exploded and 
the depression had hit with full force in October 1929. The 
problem was survival and every effort was strained toward 
that end. 
A year later there was concern that the submission of 
the World Court protocols in the Senate might block 
emergency legislation in the short session and thereby 
necessitate an extra session. Nevertheless, President 
Hoover in his annual message to Congress on December 10, 
1930 declared his pOSition in relation to the World Court 
question. In this message we can see that this problem 
41 Ibid., March 12, 1929. 
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was no longer a major issue. The country had witnessed the 
"Crash of t 29" and was definitely feeling the need of 
assistance in trying to stem the full tide of the depression. 
The pyesident was of course aware of this critical condition 
throughout the country and was willing to give it necessary 
precedence over the Court. In making known to Congress his 
policies, he stated: "I trust the protocols may have 
consideration as soon as possible after the emergency relief 
and appropriate legislation has been disposed of." He 
continued discussing the Court and gave a brief history 
stressing the most recent developments. He reiterated that 
he believed the United States should join the Court and 
stated: 
••• on January 27, 1926 following 
extended consideration the Senate advised 
and gave consent to adherence to the 
court with five reservations; and it 
gave authorisation to effect their 
acceptance by an exchange of notes. 
Consent to four of these was promptly 
expressed at a meeting of the nation 
members of the court and after 
negotiations undertaken with the 
approval of President Coolidge two 
protocols were drawn to revise the 
statutes of the court in order to 
embody their oonsent and also to meet 
the fifth reservation. The protocol 
of accession of the United States and 
the protocol of reviSion have now been 
signed by practically all the nations 
which are members of the court and have 
already been ratified by a large majority 
of those nations. 
2 
The prov~s~on of the protocols 
free us from any entanglement in the 
diplomacy of nations. We can not be 
summoned before this court. We can 
from time to time seek its services by 
agreement with other nations. These 
permit our withdrawal from the court 
at any t ime without reproach or ill Will. 
The movement for the establishment 
of such a court originated with our 
country. It has been supported by 
Presidents Wilson, Harding and Coolidge; 
by Secretaries of State Hughes, Kellogg 
and St ims on •••• 
Through the Kellogg-Briand pact we 
have pledged ourselves to the use of 
pacific means in settlement of all 
controversies. Our great Nation, so 
devoted to peace and justice should 
lend its co-operation in this effort 
[World CourtJ of the nations to establish 
a great agency for such pacific 
settlement. 42 
78 
Immediately after this message from the President was· 
read Senator Borah recommended that the following editorial 
from the New York Slm entitled, "When League Court Protocol 
---
Come s Out, Kill It", be included in the re cord. 
We might make friends for a 
day by entering the leagUe court. 
We should make enemies for a 
generation when the time came - and 
it inevitably would come - when 
circumstances compelled us to 
withdraw. Let us keep what 
friendship we have abroad by 
42 Congo Rec., v. 74, pt. 1, 504. 
refusing to adhere ••• When the 
league court protocol comes ••• 
into the Senate Chamber it should . 
meet its death. And, to make 
assurance doubly sure, the Senate 
should rescind the resolution whioh 
Geneva rejected, thus clearing the 
air oompletely of the smoke of 
danger. l 3 
This defiance on the part of the Chairman of the 
loreign Relations Committee against the President's conduct 
of our foreign policy is an example of the intensity of 
the war waged over the Court. Consideration of the issue 
was postponed for another year in fear of necessitating an 
extra session. Still no solution was found during this 
administration and the problem was passed on to the next. 
The Roosevelt landslide in November of 1932 swept a 
considerable number of Republican Senators out of office 
and assured the Democrats of a majority in the Senate of 
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the 73rd Congress but not until March 1932 did the pressure 
of domestic business lessen sufficiently to allow considera-
tion of the Court problem. 
This period of waiting for action is summarized in one 
of the country's leading newspapers as follows: 
43 Ibid. 
Diokens' Ciroumlooution Offioe was 
a miraole of speed oompared with 
the Foreign Relations Committee of 
the Senate when dealing with the 
World Court. Year after year, 
session of Congress after session of 
Congress, it goes on weaving a 
tangled web about the whole subjeot. 
Just now it has made a report to 
the Senate, but with so many 
reservations, with so many wire-
drawn objeotions and soruples, 
that aotion upon the matter seems 
impossible. 44 
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The national oonventions met soon after and both parties 
endorsed the Court onoe more, the Republicans more strongly. 
Their platform oommended this step toward the settlement of 
international disputes by the rule of law and held that we 
should join our influenoe and "gain a voice in this 
institution, which would offer us a safer, more judicial and 
expeditious instrument" than arbitration. The Demooratio 
platform simply advooated, "adherence to the World Court 
with the pending reservations."45 One member of the press 
maintained that argument for and against Amerioan adherenoe 
had long sinoe been exhausted. The two politioal parties 
had favored our joining the Court again and again, "but their 
leaders have done nothing about it exoept recommend." There 
was always fear of a long debate, so action on the issue 
44 Times, May 16, 1932. 
45 Ibid., June 16 and 30, 1932. 
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necessarily waited until a more convenient season. But 
rtjudging from the past, that season will never come. Successi 
congresses and Presidents of both political parties have made 
a long and painful record of dilatoriness and indifference 
in this matter. It 46 
Finally on January 6, 1935 it was thought that the 
convenient time had arrived for a serious consideration of 
the World Court proposals during the Roosevelt administration. 
President Roosevelt called a conference of party leaders 
at which it was decided to bring to the fore the Court 
protocols. 47 
Many felt that a President as popular as Roosevelt 
could certainly evoke prompt ratification and it was 
estimated that at this time not more than twelve senators 
would vote against the Court.4S 
, But signs of opPosition impelled the President to send 
a message to the Senate, (on January 16, 1935) in which he 
stated: 
46 Ibid., March 24, 1934. 
-
47 !!U:4., January 6, 1935. 
48 Ibid., January 12, 1935. 
The movement to make international justice practicable and servicable is 
not subject to partisan considerations 
for years Republican and Democratic 
Administrations and party platforms 
alike have advocate4 a court of justice 
to which nations might voluntarily bring 
their disputes for judicial decision. 
To give concrete realization to 
the obviously sound and thoroughly 
American policy I hope that at an early 
date the Senate will advise and consent 
to the adherence of the United States 
to the Protocol of Signature of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of 
Justice dated December 16, 1920, the 
Protocol for the Revision of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of 
Justice, dated September 14, 1929, 
and the Protocol of Signature of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of 
Justice, dates September 14, 1929, all 
of whioh were submitted to the Senate 
December 10, 1930. 49 
Mindful of what had happened in 1926 the President urged: 
••• that the Senate's oonsent be given 
in such form as not to defeat or to 
delay the objective of adherence. 
The sovereignty of the United 
States will be in no way diminished 
or jeopardized by such action. At 
this period in international 
relationship when every act is of 
moment to the future of world peace, 
the United States has an opportunity 
once more to throw its weight into the 
scale in favor of peace.50 
49 Cong. ~., V.79, pt. 1, 468. 
50 Ibid. 
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As soon as this message of the President's had been 
read Senator Hiram Johnson took the floor to maintain that he 
wanted peace and said, "What peace do we gain by going into 
the Court or by going into the League of Nations?" He 
stated that going into the Court would "ultimately mean going 
into the League of Nations just as surely as night follows 
day. " He also claimed this was the worst moment to go 
into the Court, when "all Europe sits on a volcano" and 
no one knows when the eruption will come. 51 
It is interesting to note that Senator Johnson 
rejected any responsibility for the long delays about the 
Court. He maintained: 
If Mr. Root had not at the instance 
of Sir Cecil Hurst manufactured 
something destroying our irreducible 
minimum of protection there would 
have been no delay.~2 
The next day Senator Huey Long, of Louisiana, gave the 
Senate what the press termed "a three-hour harangue. Waving 
his arms and shouting at the top. of his lungs," he accused 
the Standard Oil Company, of financing wars." This appeared 
51 Ibid., 479-489. 
52 ~., 479. 
to be the beginning of a filibuster and seemed that the 
usual process of killing the Court was under way again. 
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Many resolutions favoring the proposed entrance of the 
United States in the World Court are to be found which 
show the pressure laid upon the Senators at that time. 
To mention just a few: American Bar Association, Faculty 
of Colby College, Montana Bar Association, Women's 
Organization of Kansas and also a statement from General 
John F. OtRyan urging American entrance.54 Favorable 
communications were also sent by: Rotary Club of Pleasant-
ville, New Jersey, Rotary Club of Dallas, Texas, Bar 
Association of Erie, New York, American Legion Posts of New 
York, Miami Florida Women's Club, Women's Republioan Club 
of Orange, New Jersey, Chamber of Commerce of Wellsboro, 
Pennsylvania and National Committee of Republican Women. 55 
A letter was also sent from Democrats throughout the country 
to Democratic Senators asking for action on the World Court 
during the present short session. This letter was as follows: 
54 Congo E!£., v. 79, pt. 14, 611. 
55 Ibid., v. 75, pt. 15, 659. 
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As the short session opens, we 
think it in order to emphasize the 
clear implication of the Democratic 
ilatform of 1932 recommending 
adherence of the United States to 
the World Court with the pending 
reservations" •••• we respectfully 
urge the exercise of your own 
influence toward expediting the 
court on the Senate Calendar 
••• in order that a record vote may 
be reached before adjournment 
March 4. 
Our'hope is that you share our 
view that the Senate should consent 
to the ratification of the three 
pending treaties which were favorably 
reported to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on January 1st 
last, and which when ratified will 
achieve the adherence of the United 
States to the coUrt. 56 
This letter was signed by about a hundred prominent 
persons throughout the country inoluding: John W. Davis, 
of New York City, former Ambassador to Great Britain; 
James M. Cox, former Governor of Ohio; Gilbert Hitchoock, 
former United States Senator from Nebraska; George Fort 
Milton, historian and publisher of Chattanooga ~.57 
We also find a petition circulated by a national 
group of Republican women organized to support the 
administration's pol:b y of ratification of the World Court 
Protocols. This organization was considered to be a 
56 Ibid., v. 76, pt. 1, 301. 
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representative group of women who circulated this petition 
extensively through out the country. The petition 
distinctly clarified their stand on the issue by stating 
that they were: 
••• organized for the so Ie 
purpose of making clear to the 
public and the Senate the 
support which Republican women 
through-out the country 
entertain for ratifioation of 
the three World Court protocols 
whioh the u.nit~d states signed 
two years ago.~8 
The members of this organization were headed by the 
Chairman, Mrs. Arthur Levermore, also president of the 
Women's National Republican Club and six vice-chairman: 
Miss Sarah Schuyler Butler also of the New York State 
Republican Committee, Mrs. Worthington Scrants and Mrs. 
Grace Semple Burlingham both members of the Republican 
National Committee, Mrs. Silas Strawn of Illinois and 
Mrs. Charles Taft 2nd, of Ohio. 
This committee prepared a message which was sent to 
thousands of Republican women voters allover the country. 
58 Ibid., v. 75, pt. 2, 2129. 
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It urged immediate support for the official Republican 
policY and indorsed the adherence of the United states to 
the World Court. This message said in part: 
The question now before the 
Senate is not whether we shall enter 
the World Court. The Senate in 1926 
by a vote of 76 to 17 passed a 
resolution declaring that we should; 
if five reservations were met. 59 
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The public generally thought that the result could not 
be in doubt. Roosevelt's prestige was great and the mind of 
the nation had been made up for a long time. Only two days 
before the vote on the Court was cast the New York Times 
declared that "There has. never been a doubt, especially since 
the President's message that two-thirds of the Senate would 
favor ratification", though it added Roosevelt was "puzzled" 
by the methods of the oppOSition in fighting the treaty.bO 
On January 29, 1935, the Senate voted on the Court 
protocols and defeated them by a vote of fifty-two favoring 
adherence to thirty-six against. Forty-three Democrats and 
nine Republicans voted for adherence; twenty Democrats, 
fourteen Republicans, and two others voted against. By 
this we see that a strong majority still stood by the Court 
59 Ibid. 
60 Times, January 27, 1935. 
88 
but it was not strong enough, for seven votes were lacking 
to make the necessary two-thirds. 6l 
As could be expected many factors entered into the 
rejection. Overconfidence was blamed by some for the defeat. 
others claimed that, "The leadership of the Administration 
forces was too languid •••• " and that "Mr. Roosevelt was misle 
still other reasons advanced were that, ftwhile the supporters 
of the treaty slept ••• its opponents kept up a secret but 
effective campaign against it," and that minor causes, 
personal and political entered into the defeat but considered 
the most important element, was the successful appeal to 
have nothing to do with Europe. 62 
President Roosevelt made no comment on the vote except 
to say, that he was very grateful to Senator Robinson, the 
Democratic leader, for the able and honorable fight he had 
conducted, and to the other pro-court Senators. 63 
Senator Borah stated triumphantly that this was the 
most important Senate action since the World War and by 
this the Court issue in the United States may be said to have 
been officially dead. 64 
61 Ibid. , January 30, 1935. 
62 Ibid. , January 31, 1935. 
63 Ibid. 
64 I • I 
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Immediately after the defeat of the Court, Senator 
Robinson, majority leader, wrote an article about the struggle 
in which he said that some fifteen senators who were friendly 
to ratification, but not unqualifiedly committed, ended by 
joining the opposition, while only two votes not counted upon 
were picked up. He ascribed the result to the organized 
resistance, which gathered volume, and to its "exaggerations, 
misinformation, political threats, and misrepresentations." 
pictures were painted "of battle scenes, death, desolation, 
and sacrifices to accomplish purposes in no wise related to 
the welfare of our people."65 
I~ would be thought that the defeat of so serious and 
widespread an issue would be cause for a marked reaction, at 
least in Washington but this was not the case. Arthur Krock, 
reported that congreSSional leaders, including Senator 
Robinson, went serenely about their business. At the White 
House, also, the President seemed in his press conference 
"to be sincerely unconcerned about the action of the Senate. 
Nothing like a pall hung over official Washington."66 
65 Ibid., February 3, 1935. 
66 Ibid., January 31, 1935. I 
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Quite to the contrary the day following the defeat was 
the President's birthday and he was preparing to celebrate it 
with the entire nation invited to attend birthday balls held 
in his honor, allover the country. 
This defeat well illustrates that the failure of the 
United States to join with other States in their efforts to 
make the Court a universal agency for the development of 
international law may be attributed in part to its position 
as a non-member of the League of Nations. As we have seen 
the debates as well as the fate of the American reservations, 
turned chiefly on advisory opinions, but the hostility to 
them was largely due to the fact that the opinions were given 
by the Court at the request of the Council of the League of 
Nations. The relation of the League to the Court attached such 
a stigma to the Court that it ultimately brought it down to 
defeat. 
In consequence, the Government of the United states 
has had.no share in maintaining the Court and has made no 
financial contribution to its support. Though an eminent 
American, Elihu Root participated in drafting the Court's 
Statute and the American members of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration regularly nominated candidates in the elections 
of judges after 1923, and four Americans were successively 
elected as judges of the Court, John Bassett Moore, Charles 
Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, and Manley O. Hudson. 
yet with one exception the United states refrained from 
entering into agreements with other States providing for 
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the Court's jurisdiotion; by becoming a member of the 
International Labor Organiz.ation, ::the United Stat.es conferred 
on the Court the jurisdiotion to be provided for in the 
constitution of that organization. 
Without challenging the motives of the Senators who 
labored for limitations and ultimately defeat of the World 
Court protocols, we can not help but question the means used 
to attain their end. 
For twelve years the Senate professed an ardent desire 
for a type of court suoh as provided for in the protocols 
presented to them; many times voting for it but always with 
some reservations that prevented the aotion whioh they had 
professed. Such a oourse as this dictated by the Senate could 
not help but mar its prestige. 
CHAP~ER IV 
A~TI~UDES IN YEARS OF SPECIAL DEVELOPMEN~ 
I hope it is practicable, by 
improving the mind and morals 
of society, to lessen the 
disposition to war; but of 
its abolition I despair. l 
After reviewing the prolonged and entailed developments 
over the World Court it is most gratifying and reassuring to 
oonsider the Kellogg Peaoe Paot. ~he oorrespondence between 
France and the United States during the years 1927 and 1928 
was simple, sinoere and thereby suocessful. During the 
previous deoade a small but influential group, inoluding 
Samuel O. Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, and Professor James ~. 
Shotwell, of Columbia University, had been urging that instead 
of making laws recognizing war as a legal oondition, there 
should be laws against war, making it illegal, Professor 
Ihotwell, oonsidered one of the ablest of the leaders of this 
movement, while visiting Franoe in the spring of 1927, 
presented his i4eas to Foreign Minister Briand. The result 
1 ~homas Jefferson, The Writings g! Thomas Jefferson, 
Andrew A. Lipsoomb, Editor, The Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Assooiation, Washington, D.C., 1903, v. 18, 298. 
92 
93 
of these Briand-Shotwell disoussions was the Briand proposal 
of April 6, 1927. 2 It was on this day, the tenth anniversary 
of the United States entranoe into World War I, that M. Briand 
entrusted to the Associated Press his famous message, 
addressed to the Amerioan people. 3 Here in this instanoe the 
poreign Minister of France challenged publio opinion by his 
offer to oommit the Government of France to a renunoiation 
of war as an instrument of national policy if the United 
states would oooperate with it in this aot Uto outlaw war". 
The signifioant passage of this message is as follows: 
For those whose lives are devoted 
to seouring this living reality of a 
polioy of peaoe the United States and 
Franoe already appear before the world 
as morally in full agreement. If there 
were need for these two great demooracies 
to give high testimony to their desire for 
peace and to furnish to other people an 
example more solemn still, France would 
be willing to subscribe publioly with the 
United States to any mutual engagement 
tending"to outlaw war," to use an American 
expression, as between these two oountries. 
The renunoiation of war as an instrument 
of national policy is a oonoeption already 
familiar to the signatories to the Covenant 
of the League of Nations and of the Treaties 
of Locarno. Every engagement entered into 
in this spirit by the United States toward 
another nation such as Franoe would 
2 James T. Shotwell, War As An Instrument of National 
Policy, Haroourt Brace and Co., New York, 1929, 45=46. 
3 Literar: Digest, November 26, 1927. 
contribute greatly in the eyes of the 
world to broaden and strengthen the 
foundations on which the international 
policy of peace is being ereoted. 
These two great friendly nations, 
equally devoted to the oause of peace, 
would furnish to the world the best 
illustration of the truth that the 
immediate end to be attained is not 
so much disarmament as the practical 
application of peace itself. 4 
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This message did not immediately receive much public 
attention. In fact it passed Virtually unnoticed by the 
American press for nearly three weeks. Then Dr. NiCholas 
Murray Butler worte a letter which appeared in a prominent 
newspaper on April 25, 1927. This letter repeated the above 
passage from M. Briand's message and asked: 
Is it possible that the American 
people failed to hear the extraordinarily 
important message addressed to them 
through the AssOCiated Press •••• If not 
what answer db they propose to make J and 
how long will they permit M. Briand 
to be kept waiting for the answer?5 
This communication of Dr. Butler's aroused dormant 
public opinion. Though we find instances of thiS awakening 
in the press there was apparently no sudden concerted effort 
4 International ConciJ..1at.ton, No. 243, 463. 
5 Times, April 25, 1927. 
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on the part of the general public to encourage a prompt reply 
to M. Briand's proposal. 
Undaunted by the coldness of its reception in many 
quarters the advocates of outlawry kept up their campaign. 
Though the State Department had neglected to answer the 
informal question of M. Briand's of April 6, 1927 he was 
determined to receive a reply. 
No details were specified in his note of April 6, 1927 
and technically since this was not presented through. the 
proper diplomatic channels no reply was necessary_ But 
M. Briand evidently was not content with the reaction. Since 
our treaty of arbitration with France was to expire on 
February 28, 1929, he, no doubt, considered this an opportune 
time to discuss the subject of a new treaty. So on June 20, 
1927 M. Briand formally submitted the following treaty in 
which the State Department could hardly have replied in the 
negative and which did necessitate an answer. TheSe two 
short paragraphs are the very heart of the treaty. Just these 
following two articles with the addition of the prOVisions 
for Signature and ratification form the entire treaty. 
s 
Article 1 
The high contracting parties solemnly 
declare in the names of their respective 
peoples that they condemn recourse to war 
for the solution of international contro~ 
versies, and renounce it as an instrument 
of national policy in their relations 
with one another. 
Article 2 
The high contracting parties agree 
that the settlement or solution of all 
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature' 
or of whatever origin they may be, 
which may arise among them, shall gever 
be sought except by pacific means. 
This message of M. Briand's was followed by a rather 
long period of inaction on the part of the United States. 
The reasons for this Secretary Kellogg explained in the 
following memorandum written at a later date. 
The President at this time was in 
Dakota spend ing the summer, and I had 
nq opportunity to discuss the matter 
wi th him. Furthermore, Congre ss had 
adjourned, and neither the President 
nor I thought it was advisable to 
enter into a treaty unless We had 
some assurance that it would receive 
6 International Qo.rfu.,iJiati.iQ1l, No. 243, 522-523. 
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the ratification of the Senate. 
I was criticized by some newspapers 
for the delay, but I felt, as the 
President did, that in a matter of 
this tremendous importance it was 
best to make haste slowly and be 
sure that we were taking the steps 
which would be approved by the 
Senate of the United State§ and 
the people of the Country."' 
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Secretary Kellogg claamed that after conversations with 
Senator Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and with members of this committee he came "to the concluSion 
that they would not approve a bilateral treaty with France 
and the United States; but ••• they would approve a multi-
lateral treaty such as I had in mind, with all the nations 
of the world. 118 
In the present situation the probable attitude of the 
Senate seemed to be a factor of crucial importance. The 
difficulty of ascertaining what this attitude would be in 
relation to any proposal that might be made, with the Senate 
in adjournment and the President on vacation was obvious. 
Mr. Kellogg apparently had a deep sense of the importance 
of having the Senate with him. He, of course, knew the 
7 David Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg, G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, New York, 1937, 239. 
8 Ivid.; 
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difficulties that had arisen on other occasions as a result 
of the seeming disregard of the Senate perogatives by President 
and Secretaries of State in previous negotiations. The 
oontroversies in relation to the League of Nations were still 
evident and probably served as a warning to him to proceed 
with caution. It appeared that he was determined at least 
not to repeat the more obvious mistakes of the Wilson era. 
Therefore his policy which was interpreted as inaction and 
delay until December 1927, when the Senate was in seSSion 
aotually gave him the opportunity to engage in these 
oonversations with the Senate leaders to which he referred. 
Certainly there was an advantage in waiting for as 
important a factor as the attitude of the Senate, but public 
opinion was still important and some delay would give it time 
to grow and to clarify. It is belived by some observers that 
Kellogg realized from the beginning of the negotiations ,that 
success depended upon the force and intelligence of that 
opinion, and that he could not have been unaware that he would 
meet obstacles and opposition in protracted negotiations. 9 
As experienced a man as he must have realized that a proposal 
such as he was contemplating would give rise to suspicions 
9 Ibid., 240. 
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and objections. This is apparently the basis for his 
revolutionary policy of doing away with the customary method 
of secret diplomacy and must ,have determined his course to 
conduct the negotiations in the full light of public 
inspection with the aid of the press and other agencies for 
distribution and dissemination of knowledge. The success of 
the proposals was to prove just how right his decision was 
in formulating and in continuing this policy. 
By the autumn of 1927 this growth and clarification of 
public opinion was quite evident. The following opinions are 
presented as indicative of this. By November the press had 
predicted that public opinion had reached such a pitch that 
the proposal to outlaw war promised to be a live subject in 
Washington through the winter. lO 
The paot is a subject on which we find not so much a 
variety of opinions as a variety of people expressing in 
various ways approximately the same opinion. Even the 
President was approached for action. 
It is noted that a delegation visited the White House 
bearing a petition signed by hundreds of prominent churchmen 
throughout the country supporting the Briand proposal. 11 
10 Literary Digest, November 26, 1927, 11. 
11 Ibid. 
-
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it that time President Coolidge is said to have announced that 
negotiations toward a treaty to outlaw war would be begun as 
soon as Ambassador Herrick returned to France. Which proved 
that the treaty would be taken out of the hands of the prese 
and the people and dealt with acco~ding to strict diplomatic 
procedure. 12 
Like the treaty which embodied the League of Nations 
this pact was hailed, by some, in quite idea~istic terms. 
After reading the two articles of the proposed treaty one 
commentator said, "Those are the magnificent words which 
form ••• what is becoming to be known as the Kellogg Peace 
Pact. Read by themselves they outlaw war. ,,13 Another in 
comparing it. to the League noticed: 
The Covenant of the League required 
its members to agree to submit all disputes 
to arbitration or inquiry and not to resort 
to war until three months after the arbitral 
award or report, but it left a gap that 
war might then be declared. The Kellogg 
plan seems to close that gap. Unqualified 
it would constitutela new era in inter-
national relations. 4 
12 Ibid. 
13 ~. 
14 Ibid. 
But it also pointed out that, "unfortunately it is not 
unqualified. Mr. Kellogg's note of June 23 substantially 
accept ed the French reservations to his original treaty," 
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and held that, "Mr. Kellogg's acceptance of an undefined right 
of self-defense is another matter, opening the gates to such 
interpretation of his pact as may leave nothing of it."15 
Secretary Kellogg answered this indictment by defining 
his policy toward the right of self-defense. He declared: 
There is nothing in the American 
draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts 
or impairs in any way the right of self-
defense •••• Every nation is free at all 
times and regardless of treaty provisions 
to defend its te~itory from attack or 
invasion, and it alone is competent to 
decide whether circumstances require 
recourse to war in self-defense. 16 
Analysis of Mr. Kellogg's explanations of his treaty 
led to various interpretations. Many were led to a suspicion 
that perhaps the whole affair was intended, "rather as an 
election year gesture to warm the hearts of the American 
people toward the Republican Party then as a real forward 
step in international relations. 17 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
-
17 The Nation, The Nation Incorporated, New York, 1928, 
v.127, 76.-
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The opposition was not altogether silent. Drew Pearson 
in a Consolidated Press dispatch from Washington pointed out 
what he believed to be two weak spots in the Briand plan. 
These were: 
The well founded fear that such 
a treaty negotiated with France alone 
would be construed as an alliance; and 
the belief that such a treaty would 
guarantee the supremacy of France on 
the European continent and tie the 
hands of the United States in case of 
European conflict. 18 
He expanded these points by declaring that through 
treaties France had built up a "family of loyal nations" which 
made her almost supreme on the continent. His belief was that 
only one thing was lacking to make France absolutely supreme. 
This was the assurance that the United States would remain 
open to her as a source for munitions. With this country as 
a neutral the American Navy would be used to protect American 
merchantmen carrying supplies to France, and by this policy 
we would be risking a war with the opponent of France and that 
"eventually the United States would find itself pulled into 
the conflict." 19 
18 Literary Digest, November 26, 1927, 12. 
19 Ibid. 
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A less forceful yet more pessimistic viewpoint expressed 
and flatly declared that, "nations are never going to avoid 
violent outbreaks by merely agreeing in advance."20 
We are also reminded that there was the Senate to be 
considered and that it 'l6S not an easy matter to get any 
treaty through the Senate.· In considering this aspect it was 
remembered that this treaty would go into the Senate with 
several millstones around its neck. There was for instance, 
the fact that the debt agreement with France remained 
unratified and the fact that France did not send delegates to 
the naval disarmament conference at Geneva, and also the 
difficulties with France over the tariff question were to be 
considered. 21 
The New York Times reminded us that: 
If favorable sentiment could be 
registered in the several States and 
at Washington by the time that the 
Senate meets again, it should have a 
wholesome effect in preparing the way 
for such a treaty, not only with France, 
but with each of the other Powers, with 
which the United States already has 
treaties of conciliation that are soon 
expiring. 22 
20 ~. 
21 ~. 
22 Times, November 19, 1927. 
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As prospects developed for consideration in the Senate 
of the proposals one editor observed that, "the important 
is that the Briand plan has been taken out of the pigeon 
hole at Washington,." He claimed that, "President Coolidge can 
render the oause of peace a very distinct service by submitt 
to the Senate a treaty to carry out the desire that is in the 
hearts of the people. n23 
The real attitude of the United States upon this issue 
was at last becoming artioulate in a way which could not fail 
to find expression in Congress. 
Throughout the following months this general movement 
of American public opinion continued to gain strength and to 
find effective expression not only in Congress but outside it 
as well. This fact should not be forgotten as we turn to the 
proposals for aotually embodying it on the part of the 
Government of the United States. It should be born in mind 
that public opinion throughout the United States gathered 
such force in the support of the proposals during the summer 
1927 that when Congress met in December there were resolutions 
in both Senate and House calling for action. Two of the most 
important and significant were those of Senator Arthur Capper 
23 Litera;l Digest, November 6, 1927, 11. 
of Kansas, a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, chairman of this committee. 
These two resolutions received widespread attention throughout 
the country. Though these resolutions did not bring to the 
fore any new items of discussion they did epitomize the 
consideration of these proposals as brought out in public 
discussions since the Briand note. Senator Borah's 
resolution of December 1927, was almost identical With one 
presented by him on February 13, 1923 dealing with the 
problem of a world court. 24 It was as follows: 
Resolved, That it is the view of the 
Senate of the United States that war 
between nations should be outlawed as 
an institution or means for the . 
settlement of international con-
troversies by making it a public 
crime under the law of nations •••• 
Resolved Further, That a code of 
international law of peace based 
upon the outlawry of war and on 
the prinCiple of equality and justice between all nations ••• 
should be created and adopted. 
Second, That, with war outlawed, a judicial substitute for war should 
24 Cong. Rec., v. 67, pt. 4, 441 and v. 69, pt. 1, 
477-478-
be created ••• modeled on our 
Federal Supreme Court ••• to hear 
and decide ••• international 
controversies •••• and its judgments 
shall not be enforced by war under 
any name or any form ••• but shall 
have the same power for their 
enforcement as our Supreme Court, 
namely, the respect of all 
enlightened nations for judgments 
resting upon open and fair 
investigations and impartial 
decisions, the agreement of the 
nations to abide, and be bound 
by such' judgments, and the 
compelling power of enlightened 
public opinion. 25 
Senator Capper's resolution reviewed the favorable 
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attitude of the United States toward adjusting disputes 
through "mediation and arbitration" from 1916 to the Briand 
note of April 6, 1927, and declared: 
Whereas there has been strong 
expression of opinion from the 
people and the press of the 
United States in favor of 
suitable action by our 
government to give effect 
to the proposal of Monsieur 
Briand; and 
Whereas the present arbitration 
treaty between the United States 
and France providing for the 
submission to arbitration of 
25 Ibid., v. 69, pt. 1, 477-478. 
b 
differences of a legal nature 
arising between them will 
terminate on February 27, 1928 •••• 
Be it further resolved, that the 
President be requested to enter 
into negotiations with France 
and other like-minded nations 
for the purposes of concluding 
treaties with such nations, in 
furtherance of the declared 
policy of the United States. 26 
This resolution continued by stating the definition of an 
aggressor nation. It declared: 
By formal declaration to accept 
the definition of aggressor nation 
as one which having agreed to 
submit international differences 
to conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, begins 
hostilities without having done so •••• 27 
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It was the opinion of those who watched public opinion 
develop that the ~ising tide of public opinion voiced in 
Congress by these resolutions and others was directly 
responsible for the negotiations which led to the Pact of 
Paris. 28 Secretary Kellogg reported later that there was < some 
opposition but at "least 90 percent of the United States 
enthusiastically favored the ratification" and that he 
26 International Conciliation, No. 242, 441. 
27 ~. 
28 Shotwell, VI, VII. 
I I! ! 
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received 500 letters a day requesting action on this issue. 29 
Before examining the reaction of others to this plan to 
abolish war let us determine what Secretary Kellogg, himself, 
had to say about it. Speaking in New York, on March 15, 
before the Council on Foreign Relations, ,he reviewed the 
history of the negotiations between France and the United 
States from June 20, 1927 the date the formal note was 
presented which contained the bilateral provision and then 
reviewed his note of Deoember 28, 1927. 30 In this later 
note Secretary Kellogg stated: 
The Government of the United 
states welcomes every opportunity for joining with the other Governments 
of the world in condemning war and 
pledging anew its faith in arbitration. 
It is firmly of the opinion that every 
international endorsement of arbitration, 
and every treaty repudiating the idea 
of a resort to arms for the settlement 
of justifiable disputes, materiall~ 
advances the cause of V() rId peace. ,1 
This was the communication that set forth the 
multilateral provision to include, Great Britain, Germany, 
Italy and Japan. In his speech of March 15, Mr. Kellogg 
29 Bryn-Jones, 237. 
30 Literary Digest, March 31, 1928, 6. 
31 Foreign Polic: Association Information Service, 
Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1928, v.3, No. 25, 409. 
l~ 
oontinued by pointing out that France promptly agreed .to thia 
idea of a multilateral treaty but that France suggested that 
the treaty provide only for the renunciation of wars of 
aggression. Kellogg objected to this and stated the reasons 
for this objection. He said: 
My objection to limiting the scope 
of an anti-war treaty to mere wars of 
aggression is based partly upon a very 
real disinclination to see the ideal of 
world peace qualified in anyway, and 
partly upon the absence of any 
satisfactory definition of the word 
"aggressor" or the phrase "wars of 
aggression". It is difficult for 
me to see how a definition could be 
agreed upQn Which would not be open 
to abuee.,2 
Throughout the negotiations we find that Secretary 
Kellogg was not agreeable to the use of economic sanctions 
to enforce this treaty but he did believe that true 
enforcement must come from the peoples of the world. In 
order to maintain peace he declared: 
In addition to treaties there 
must be an aroused public conscience 
against the utter horror and 
frightfulness of war. The peoples 
of the world must enjoy a peaceful 
mind ••• and treaties ••• and the 
32 Literary Digest, March 31, 1928, 6. 
II 
efforts of statesmen to advance the 
cause of world peace can only be 
regarded as a portion of this problem. 33 
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Evidently Secretary Kellogg was not as idealistically 
inclined as some of his followers or as some memb~rs of the 
press would have us believe. In the following statement we 
see that he was rather modest in his belief of what the treaty 
could do. He said: 
I am not so blind as to believe 
that the millennium has arrived, but 
I do believe that the world is making 
great strides toward the pacific 
adjustment of international disputes, 
and that the common people are of 
one mind in their desire to see the 1 
abolition of war as an institution. 34 
He was far more modest than many of the other proponents 
of the movement to outlaw war. In the press a variety of 
statements showed that for the most part the people of this 
country were willing to acclaim this as a momentous action 
on the part of the peoples of the world. One writer hailed 
the Kellogg Pact as, "One of the greatest events since the 
birth of Christ. fI Though President Coolidge was more 
reserved he called the Pact of Paris tta great step forward in 
the preservation of peaceful relations between nations. "35 
33 
34 
35 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
-
Ibid. 
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Secretary Kellogg referred to it as "a moral step forward of 
civilization. "36 But James T. Shotwell, one of the early 
leaders of the movement, cautioned against any idealistic 
type of thinking and called for a practical viewpoint. He 
declared: 
The pact of Paris must be judged, not merely as an expression 
of international morals, as some 
of its friends have tried to 
interpret it, but as the effective 
embodiment of political realities; 
unless it has some practical value, 
it has little value at all. 37 
A point worthy of conSideration was brought out by David 
Hunter Miller, an authority on the legal aspects of the pact. 
What he considered the most striking feature of the Kellogg-
Briand Treaty was one that was not written in its text. He 
pointed out that the treaty is perpetual. That it contained 
no clause of limitation, and no provision for determination 
or denunCiation. It was made to last for all time, except 
for the theory that all the signatories would unanimously 
agree to end it. Even the preamble, h.e declared, " ••• indicate 
that the Treaty would not be terminated or abrogated by its 
violation, even as to a delinquent Party; the Aggressor is 
merely deprived of its benefits. Tt38 
36 
37 
38 
Putnam's 
Ibid. 
Shot we 11 , VII. 
David Hunter Miller, The Peace ~ £! PariS, G. P. 
It is also interesting to note that the idea and 
very language of the Treaty were adapted from the proposal 
of M. Briand of April 6, 1927, which he called a "Pact of 
~erpetual Friendship".39 
Another item which is also of importance is one to which 
it seemed incredible that the Senate ever agreed. Miller 
observed that the treaty was a qualification of the Constitut 
He showed that it definitely was an alteration of that 
document. Though he did not use the word "amendment" he 
claimed that, "the Treaty marked as real a change in the 
Constitution of the United States as would any amendment 
proposed by two-thirds of each House and ratified by three-
fourths of the Senate." 40 By this treaty the war-making 
power of Congress was limited. The Constitution delegates 
to Congress the sole right of declaring war, if and when, and 
for a valid reason or for no reason at all, but with the 
treaty, Congress may not declare war unless and until the 
United States has sought and failed to settle the dispute 
with the other country "by pacific means". Congress maY' not 
declare war as an instrument of national policy. It may 
39 Ibid. 
40 ~., 148. 
• 
, 
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declare war only iri self-defense on occasion when the treaty 
is violated by another Power. 4l 
Miller further clarified this analysis and maintairied 
that this limitation was not imposed upon us but rather that 
it was of our own choosing and that the United states was not 
alone in this alteration of its fundamental law. He stated: 
The Treaty is our own suggestion 
our pledge to the ~ivilized world; and 
it is also the supreme Law of the Land, 
all other Powers by their acceptance 
of the Treaty limit their freedom of 
action under the hitherto accepted 
rules of international law, but like 
other Powers with written Constitutions, 
we also limit our freedom of action 
under our fundamental law; in a very 
real sense (not the strict legal sense) 
we forever curtail one of the con-
stitutional powers ~f the Congress of 
the United States. 4 
Had there been a popular opposition to the Kellogg-
Briand proposal, this legal argument would have made itself 
heard much more than was actually the case. The fact that it 
was not taken up widely nor strongly supported was an 
additional proof that the public opinion of the country 
remairied favorable to the proposal. 
41 Ibid. 
42 ~., 149. iii 
I 
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When had a matter of such extraordinary importance been 
expedited as had this Kellogg-Briand Pact? On April 6, 1927 
M. Briand suggested the bilateral agreement and on August 27, 
1928 fifteen nations signed the pact outlawing war "as an 
instrument of national policy in their relation with one 
another. If Included amohg the signatories were the 
Governments of: Germany, the United States of America, 
Belgium, France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Union of South Africa, Irish Free State, India, 
Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslavakia. 43 This historic 
event took place in the Salle de 11 Horloge of the Quai 
D'Orsay. In our country the pact was warmly heralded in the 
press and the general opinion was typified in the following 
report : 
• •• the Pact of PariS is heart jJ.y 
acclaimed in the press, with a small 
minority distrustful and fearing that 
our national interests are being betrayed. 
The general feeling is that whatever the 
treaties may lack in legal weight they 
make up for by their moral influence. 44 
43 International QsmC}i!1..1at+oa~ No. 243, 522-523. 
44 Literary Digest, September 8, 1928, 7. 
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The Senate, during the short session of the 70th 
Oongress whioh met Deoember 3, 1928, was requested by 
president Coolidge to authorize ratifioation of the Kellogg 
Treaty for the Renunoiation of war. There was little doubt 
that the Senate would be asked to ratify the treaty without 
any qualifioation or reservation, inasmuoh as Seoretary 
Kellogg insisted upon a similar unqualified aooeptanoe on 
the part of the other signatories prior to the signing in 
Paris. Although oomplianoe with the request was gained 
only by permitting the several powers to express their 
understanding of the treaty in unilateral notes or 
declarations, the text of the agreement itself had been 
signed in the preoise terms of the Amerioan Secretary of 
State without amendment or alteration. 45 
Though there was some oontroversy in the Senate 
ultimately a oompromise was reaohed. It was reported from 
the Committee to the Senate where the resolution was passed 
by a vote of 84 to. 1. Ratification was signed by President 
Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg on January 17, 1929. The one 
dissenting vote was that of Senator Blaine, of Wisoonsin~ 
It was his belief that the treaty was of little worth, that 
45 Foreign Policy, v. 3, No. 25, 321. 
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it was "not even a truce. "46 Senator Glass, of Virginia and 
Senator Hiram Johnson. of California evidenced ,about the same 
amount of faith in the treaty. Senator Johnson declared 
that since "the first casualty when war comes is truth", it 
would be a simple matter for a nation in time of need to 
declare a war in self-defense.47 Senator Borah came to the 
defense of the treaty when he asserted: 
No government refusing to come into 
conference or refusing to make an 
effort for peaceful settlement, could 
••• ever afterwards successfully 
claim that it was in good faith 
acting in self-defense. It would 
have great difficulty in satisfying 
the public opinion of the world that 
it was acting in good faith. It would 
indeed be violating the treaty. 
Here is •.• a means to test any 
government acting not in good faith 
under the treaty, and to place it in 
• position before the world where it 
would be practically impossible to 
defend its course or conduct.48 
The discussions in the Senate centered not so much aro 
the principle involved in the treaty but what procedure would 
be followed upon its violation. From the above statement of 
Senator Borah it was evident that the sanction to be applied 
in case of violation was the sole sanction of public opinion. 
46 Congo Rec., v. 70, 1467. 
47 Ibid., 1467, 1781. 
48 id ., 1269. 
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A great part of the success of this movement was due 
to the fact that for the first time since the peace problem 
had become a vital issue in practical politics, all the 
peace forces in America were united in support of a sole 
definite measure. 49 
Another remarkable feature of these negotiations was 
that the United States led in a new renunciation of war less 
than ten years after her failure to enter the League. Even 
more remarkable and stranger still was the fact that the 
United States Senate, led by Senator Borah, ratified the pact. 
In comparison to other diplomatio negotiations few 
notes were exchanged among the parties involved. In fact all 
~he documents concerning this pact are oontained in one small 
volume and most of these transaotions were publicized as 
they were sent to the respective parties. This was an 
innovation in international relations. The people, and the 
Governments of the people concerned, should be complimented. 
Especially sincere compliments should be tendered Secretary 
Kellogg and M. Briand for the execution and consummation of 
their ideal. 
49 International Conciliat1oll, No. 242, 448. 
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In his Armistice Day address of 1929, President Hoover 
summarized the two modes of procedure possible in case of an 
outbreak of violence. He said: 
The European nations have by the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, 
agreed that if nations fail to 
settle their differences peaceably, 
then force should be applied by 
other nations to oompel them 
to be reasonable. We have refused 
to trave 1 this road. We are 
confident that at least in the 
Western Hemisphere that public 
opinion will suffice to oheck 
Violence. This is ~he road we 
propose to travel. 5 
Little did he realize then that the first test of this road 
was to be the road-bed of the South Manchurian Railway , it 
was on this ground that the first real test of the Kellogg 
Peace Pact was tried. 
The key to the problem involved in the Manchurian crisis 
was the system of transportation. The dependence of 
Manchuria upon rail transportation meant that those who 
controlled the railroads had a very powerful influence in the 
oontrol of the country. 
50 ~., v. 31, 676. 
L :1 
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The real foundation of Chinese influence in Manchuria, 
however, was the actual settlement of the country by the 
Chinese. The small farmers and ordinary laborers of 
Manchuria were almost all Chinese. Even in theoterritory under 
Japanese control, where Japanese labor was in a more favorable 
position the Chinese were the predominant workers.5l It 
was partially because of this situation that public opinion 
was favorable to China. It was widely thought that Manchuria 
was Chinese territory. This opinion was evidenced in the 
following article. It was estimated: 
The general public the world over 
believes that Manchuria is a part of 
China and therefore occupancy by any 
other nation is an act of war.52 
Since the adoption of the Kellogg Pact the Chinese 
diplomats had two alternatives to which they could turn for 
assistance in the settlement of their problem with the Japanese 
They could appeal to the United states in case of a threat of 
war on the basis of the Kellogg Pact or they could petition 
the League for protection of their rights under the Covenant 
of the League. 
51 Current History, v. 35, 345. 
52 ~., v. 35, 350. 
b 
Hostilities officially broke out during the night of 
september 18, 1931 when Japanese troops seized the capitol 
of Manchuria. In justification of this act it was alleged 
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that some Chinese soldiers had tried to blow up the track of 
the South Manchurian Railway north of Mukden. The morning of 
the 19th found a barracks of the Manchurian army, Mukden, 
and some of the surrounding towns in the hands of the 
Japanese. 53 It is interesting to note that the Lytton 
Commission set up by the League to investigate the difficulties 
between the Chinese and the Japanese was never convinced that 
the Chinese had made this attack on the railroad.54 
This difficulty was referred to the League which was in 
session at that time. It attempted to act promptly but all 
the League members could not agree on the correct procedure 
nor would the United states assist tD bring about an immediate 
investigation of the problem. The State Department did not 
wan~ to approve a commission of inquiry or t,o'~Teethat 
Kellogg Peace Pact had been Violated, since it did not 
the 
wish 
to injure the diplomatic relations with Japan and thus weaken 
53 Re¥ort of the Commission of Enquiry A¥pointed 
Lea~e of Na ions, u:-s. Government-Printing Of ice, Was 
D. ., 1932, 71. 
54 Ibid. 
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the moderate government in power. Ambassador Debuchi of 
Japan had seemingly convinced Secretary Stimson that any 
pressure would only weaken the power of the civilians in 
the Japanese Cabinet.55 
The reaction to this was not generally expressed for 
it was not widely known but one report noticed: 
No one on the inside is likely ever 
to forget the de·~p gloom and bitter 
disillusionment that overwhelmed the 
League officials then, while the 
Japanese grew arrogant. Apparently 
frantic messages that night convinced 
Washington it must try to lIDdo the 
mistake, for Mr. Stimson rushed into 
print with a note expressing "whole-
hearted fI sympathy with League efforts. 
The American public, seeing only this 
note, neVer got the impression that 
Washington had faltered, b~t looking 
backward behind the scenes Geneva finds 
it came too late irremediable 
psychological harm had already been 
done and the favorable moment had 
gone forever.56 
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The American note of September 22 to Japan stated very 
precisely that it considered Japan responsible for the 
cessation of hostilities. It affirmed: 
55 Times, September 26, 1931. 
56 Ibid., September 18, 1932. 
The actual situation is that an arm 
of the Japanese Government is in 
complete control of South Manchuria 
••• the responsibility for determining 
the course of events with regard to 
the liquidation of this situation 
. rests largely upon Japan, for the 
Simple reason that Japanese armed 
forces have seized and are exercising 
de facto control in South Manchuria. 57 
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After suggesting that there be "no further application 
of force,"the note ended by stating: 
What has occured has already shaken 
the confidence of the public with 
r~gard to the stability of conditions 
in Manchuria and it is believed that 
the crystallization of a situation 
suggesting the necessity for an 
indefinite continuance of military 
occupation would ~urther undermine 
that confidence. 58 
These were rather strong words f~om the United States to 
Japan, but the ·Japanese leaders must have realized that the 
United States probably would not be able to unite with the 
League with pressure strong enough to restrain them. 
Since remonstrances and promises did no more than delay 
Japan's onward sweep of conquest the American Government went 
57 Senate Document, No. 55, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 5. 
58 Ibid. 
on record as emphatically opposed to this p01icy. Both 
China and Japan were notified that the American Government 
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would not recognize any agreement between these two government • 
This declaration has become known as the Stimson Doctrine. 
It stated that the Government would not admit the legality of 
any de facto situation ncrdid it intend: 
••• to recognize any treaty or agreement 
entered into between those governments, 
or agents thereof, which may impair the 
treaty rights of the United States or 
its citizens in China, including those 
which relate to the sovereignty, the 
independence, or the territorial and 
administrative integrity of the 
Republic of China, or to the inter-
national policy relative to China, 
commonly known as the open;door 
policy; and that it does not intend 
to recognize any Situation, treaty, 
or agreement which may be brought about 
. by means contrary to the covenants and 
obligations of the Pact of Paris of 
August 27, 1928, to which treaty both 
China and Japan, as well as the United 
States, are parties.59 
Copies of this doctrine were forwarded to the Signatories of 
the Nine Power Treaty with the hope that it would be possible 
to apply this to the situation at Shanghai and in Manchuria 
but this too was with out success. 60 
59 Ibid., 53-51 
60 Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, Harper and 
Brothers, New York, 1936, 159=I6~ 
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Though the Japanese objected to the United states being 
invited to meetings of the League Counoil this objection was 
over-ruled and Prentiss B. Gilbert was the United States 
representative of the Council. He was instruoted by the 
State Department to participate in its discussions only "when 
they related to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact. • •• If present at the discussion of any other aspect of 
the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as an observer 
and auditor."bl Apparently public opinion was approbative to 
action on this basis of the Kellogg Pact, for a survey of 
newspapers showed that 202 favored action and 28 opposed 
American participation at the League Council. 62 
The following address delivered by Senator Walsh, of 
Montana, expressed a favorable attitude to the League but it 
also revealed that some still bitterly opposed any relation of 
the United States to the League. Senator Walsh said: 
••• the President ••• has aroused the 
ire of critics of the League of Nations. 
They have recently poured on him ••• 
their wrath, because of his attempts 
to compare the «ifferences which 
have resulted in a state of war in 
Manchuria ••• because to that end he 
has joined with the Council of the 
League of Nations consisting of 
61 Senate Document, No. 55, 72nd Cong., 1 Sess., 18. 
62 Literary Digest, October 24, 1931, 6. 
representatives of 13 of the first 
powers. One is led to believe that 
in their unrestrained venom toward 
the League of Nations they would 
rather that open warfare ••• should 
ensue than that the League should 
be gredited with a part in averting 
it. 3 
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He continued by exalting the policy of cooperation with 
the League. He maintained: 
While conceding the high-mindedness 
of the isolationists, those of us 
who do not concur in the do-nothing 
policy, though invictives be hurled 
at us, our motives impugned, our 
patriotism questioned ••• modestly 
maintained that ours is the more 
effective, the more Christian 
policy, and I may add, it has the 
approval I believe, of the vast 
majority of the American people. 64 
The American press in the winter of 1932 was concerned 
mostly with economic f)8;'ncttons and mandates in relation to 
the Manchurian situation. The big question was whether Japan 
would be able to retain the mandate over the strategic islands 
in Pacific if she withdrew from the League. All eyes were 
focused on the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations 
which was to decide this leading question. 65 
63 Congo Rec., v. 75, pt. 3, 2866. 
64 Ibid., 2867. 
65 Literary Digest, March 4, 1933, 11 and Times, 
November 2 1 2. 
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A feature artiole in one of the oountry's prominent 
newspapers typified the attitude of the Amerioan people toward 
the inhabitants of Manohuria. It was very sympathetio to the 
oooupants of the disputed territory and played up the faot 
that their fate was in the hands of Geneva. 66 Though it was 
also noted that United States trade with Japan had not 
deoreased sinoe the Japanese oooupation of Manohuria. 67 
It was granted that the Amerioan people were sympathetic 
to the inhabitants of Manohuria but aotually the general 
opinion was that "millions of plain people care little about 
Manchuria but muoh about the peaoe machinery." Another 
statement claimed the American people realized: 
66 
67 
68 
••• that the issue cannot be regarded 
as a satisfactory test of the League's 
honesty or of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
simply because China's policy was indefensible. 
Some ardent friends of the League and with 
them, apparently, Secretary of State Henry 
T. Stimson, as an equally ardent friend of 
the ~act of Paris would like to see some 
formal oensure of Japan's actions, accepting 
the consequences in the hope that publio 
opinion of the world would approve and 
inflict some kind of moral ostraoism 
on Japan. 68 
Times, November 27, 1932. 
Ibid. , November 13, 1932. 
Ibid. , November 20, 1932. 
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In reviewing the negotiations pertinent to this crisis 
it was quite evident how very differently they were conducted 
from those relating to the creation of the Kellogg Pact. In 
this instance the State Department lapsed into the traditional 
methods of secret diplomacy. Secretary Stimson reiterated 
this fact. While the Japanese Cabinet was being changed by 
rather revolutionary means from the hands of the moderate 
government to the power of the military leaders little was t 
the American public the exact nature of their part in the 
negotiations to bring about a settlement between China and 
Japan. Secretary Stimson stated this was done to protect the 
moderate government in Japan and to give "it an opportunity 
to regain control of its own trucu1ant elements. "69 
He continued by unwittingly causing a very serious 
indictment to be recorded against his, administration of the 
State Department. He declared: 
I finally concluded that the time 
had come when the cause of peace was 
no longer best served by a situation 
in which the normal methods of 
diplomacy left the public opinion of 
America practically unguided ans 
voiceless in this controversy."f 
69 Stimson, 73. 
70 Ibid. 
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How could he or any other official justify the responsibility 
of leaving the American people "unguided and voiceless?" 
In retrospect stimson tried to relieve the blame from 
the League by claiming that, too, much was expected from it 
in ~ts first major invocation. He declared: 
Some critics have blamed the 
nations not at once setting in 
motion stronger machinery of 
compulsion against Japan; for not 
having at once invoked the 
pressure of economic sanctions. 
These critics dis'regard the 
limitations of man in international 
action. True, the power to invoke 
such measures existed within the 
League Covenant; but it had never 
been used. Mankind does not at once jump into the skillful use of new 
international machinery. The road 
of progress is ••• strewn with the 
wrecks oflprevious unsuccessful 
efforts. 7 
That the Lytton Report reviewed the entire controversy and 
made recommendations for a settlement was about the only 
lasting contribution that grew out of these negotiations in 
conne ction with the League. This report at least proved that 
the machinery of'the League could establish the essential 
facts of a controversy even though it OQuld not successfully 
cope with them when once established. 
71 Ibid., 83-84. 
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Throughout the discussion the basis for the intervention 
of the United States in the dispute was the application of the 
Kellogg Pact. The United States seemed to be in a position 
where it could actually do very little. It had invoked a 
treaty which had no enforcement machinery behind it, other 
than public opinion. If world opinion had in it any power 
to halt hostilities this crisis was the time for it to make 
its influence known. t If the Kellogg Pact, which staked every-
thing on the power of public opinion, was not to be discarded 
this was the opportune time to invoke this sanction of world 
opinion. But hostilities continued and none of the great 
powers of the world could settle the dispute. 
The illusion of a war free world began to crumble in 
1931 with Japan's invasion of Manchuria. This dispute was 
watched cautiously throughout the world. EVen three years 
before this outbreak when hostilities began smoldering it 
was estimated: 
The most difficult situation 
which our State Department has had 
to face this year is brought about 
by the Japanese ultimatum.72 
72 Litera;l Digest, July 7, 1928, 13. 
-----------------.,-. 
Most observers realized that this could bring on an 
e'xtensive wa.r and all efforts were directed to avert this 
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outcome. In the opinion of one authority in the field of 
neutrality, "when the war was over, the American attitude 
towa:rd neutrality changed" and the American people took 
shelter in the policy of isolation.73 ' He based this on the 
following theory and stated: 
••• a considerable body of publiC 
opinion, disillusioned by the 
results achieved at the Peace 
Conference (and it is immaterial 
whether and to what extent such 
disillusionment was justified) 
clamored for a return to the 
policy of isolation.74 
The defeat of the World Court in 1935 quickened the 
isolation cause. If the Court had been brought up in the 
succeeding years it probably would have received a smaller 
vote each time. 
On August 31, 1935, as Mussolini plunged toward the 
conquest of Ethopia, our first neutrality Jaw was enacted. 
It applied on arms embargo impartially to all future 
belligerents. 
73 
74 
International Conciliation, No. 358, 74. 
Ibid. 
-
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On October 5, 1937, the President momentarily escaped 
from ~igid neutrality and encourged by contact with the 
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crowds on a long trip, wrote into his Chicago speech some 
sentences apparently not scrutinized by all of his advisers on 
foreign affairs. He actually spoke of "quarantining" warlike 
powers. Isolationists everywhere took instant alarm. Their 
reaction was so intense that in his fireside talk of October 
12 the President spoke only of co-operating with the other 
signatories of the Nine Power Treaty "including China and 
Japan". Senator Pepper explained "quarantine" as merely 
letting a troubled area alone, but Senator George of Georgia 
served stern warning that he would not vote for any measure 
which would enable the President Uto declare who is the 
aggressor, to say nothing about quarantining the aggressor, 
because, in my judgement when we take that stand, we take a 
step towards war. "75 
After Japanese airman sank the American gunboat Panay 
on the Yangtze River, December 12, 1937, the isolationists in 
Washington rushed to force out of the House committee the 
Ludlow resolution to require a national referendum before 
war could be declared, "unless our territory were directly 
invaded. It The Hearst press and several peace :SOCieties 
75 Times, October 13, 1937. 
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chimed in - notably the National Council for the Prevention 
of War and the Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom - and the administration had all it could do to defeat 
the resolution in the House. Thereby the congressional 
isolationists made a drive to make it impossible either for 
themselves or any future Congress to accept war until bombs 
were raining on our own heads. 76 
There was a storm of demands that we retire from the 
Far East and have no dealings with the British in the Orient 
or elsewhere. Hitler's legions conquered Austria, March 11, 
1938 without any American condemnation. Our attention turned 
to weaning Mussolini away from Hitler, a hope which did not 
die until the day he struck Erance ~n the back. Secretary Hull 
denounced isolation and warned of war ahead and on August 18 
the President assured Canada that we would "not stand idly by 
if domination of Canadian soil is threatened."77 
The neutrality laws were not revised. Hitler invaded 
Poland on September 1, and devastated her from end to end 
on the first day. Then,. as there was no important fighting 
between Germany and the Franco-British Allies, Senator Borah 
termed the war "phony".78 
76 Ibid. 
-77 ~., August 19, 1938. 
78 Ibid., October 4, 1938. 
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Former President Herbert Hoover in appraising the 
strength of the Allies on October 3, 1939, saw no "pOSSibility 
that they can be defeated." They control the seas, said 
Hoover, and can "sit there until their enemies are exhausted," 
at the worst there would be a stalemate. "Even if Russia and 
Italy joined Germany in actual Warfare the Allies would still 
retain control of the seas. Germany might try a quick, 
overwhelming attack", he added, but there was "little reason 
to believe it can su,cceed. tr Therefore "we need to keep cool. 
For after all we must keep out of this war. We would be 
yielding the last strand of democracy if we got int·o it, 
win or lose. ,,79 
79 Catholio World, Paulist Press, New York, 1939, 
v. 150, 273. 
CBAPrER V 
ATTITUDE OF NATION IN 1939 
And peace itself is war in masquerade. l 
The attitude of the United States Government towards 
the agencies of international c'o-operation which developed 
out of the peace settlement of 1919 became considerably more 
fully defined during the fateful year of 1939, despite or 
perhaps even because of the fact that the world was once 
again moving relentlessly toward and eventually entering a 
second period of widespread hostilities. It was reported: 
The American Government gave 
fuller expression of its views towards 
the League of Nations than in any year 
Since 1919 and considerably strengthened 
its already strong position as a member 
of the International Labor Organization. 
It was only toward the Pennanent Court 
of International Justice that no 
development took place during the year. 2 
The year 1939 marked the twentieth anniversary of the 
Washington Conference of the International Labor Organization. 
1 John Dryden, "Absalom and Achitophel", The Works of 
John Dryden, Editor, George Saintsbur,y, William Patterson,-- :1 
ECiIiiburg, 1884, v. IX, pt. I, line 752, 288'1 
II 
2 International Con~iliation, No. 361, 209. 
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On November 15, a dinner was given in the Capital to 
commemorate this event. A few days later President Roosevelt, 
in a letter to the Conference in Havana, declared: 
Twenty years of the International 
Labor Organization's existence have 
proved the usefulness of such an 
organization in time of peace. I am 
confident that it can and will be 
of service to its members, indeed to 
society as a whole, in time of war. 
Its many activities make it a focal 
point from which should come constant 
reminder in these tragic times that 
human civilization can flourish only 
under conditious of just and humane 
relationships.' 
Co-operation with the League had increased greatly. It 
was a gradual evolution from non-recognition to co-operation. 
By 1927 it was reported that the co-operation of the United 
States with the ordinary activities of the League was 
constant and cordial. An official of the Secretariat said 
that "communications go back and forth quickly. There is the 
utmost courtesy and friendliness and the Washington Government 
co-operates about as far as possible, given existing 
circumstances. "4 This policy of mutual co-operation continued 
to grow and develop. In Secretary Stimson's estimation this 
3 Ibid., 257. 
4 Times, March 28, 1927. 
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'I co-operation was largely based upon the effective influence 
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in promoting the recent emergence 
of the United States from the accentuated isolationism which 
had marked its attitude towards the League of Nations since 
the Great War. It 5 
Further evidence of this cooperative spirit was given 
when the League accepted an invitation to participate in the 
New York World's Fair. 6 This cooperation never reached the 
political field. In remembering the achievements of the 
League attention was invariably called to the non-political 
advancements. 
One observer stressed: 
••• the point ••• that by its mere 
existence the League has given an 
unprecedented stimulus to 
international cooperation. 7 
To clarify this point he continued: 
The very fact that there has been 
in operation a permanent agency 
with an annual assembly, a quarterly 
Council, manifold committees, and a 
permanent staff and an adequate 
budget has made it possible for 
5 Stimson, 100. 
6 International Conciliatio~ No. 361, 209. 
7 Foreign Affairs, v. 19, 192. 
many international activities to 
catch the world's attention, 
receive a hearing, and be given 
whatever encouragement they 
deserved. 8 
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Archbishop Mc Nicholas of Cincinnati voiced his opinion 
toward the happenings of the year in a letter to members of 
his archdiocese. The trend of thought that was eminent is 
evident in this pastoral letter. Archbishop Mc Nicholas 
wrote: 
Not only must we remain aloof from 
the present war, but there seems 
to be no moral justification for 
our participation in it. Every 
Catholic citizen should weigh 
seriously the question whether he 
can conscientiously partiCipate 
in a war that is entirely 
unnecessary for us Americans and 
which he regards as morally 
wrong. 9 
The editor of this periodical envisioned us as being 
capable of remaining as impartial judges. He stated: 
••• we Americans are in the position 
of onlookers, not participants in 
the war. There is on that account 
more chance of our being impartial judges in the matter of guilt and 
blame than if we were from England 
or Germany or Russia. 10 
8 Ibid., 193. 
9 Catholic World, v. 150, 261. 
10 Ibid., 262. 
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In the later part of the year, 1939, a very interesting 
and revealing exchange of notes took place between President 
Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII. 
In the following paragraph from his note of December 13, 
1939 President Roosevelt set the tone of'these letters. He 
wrote: 
Because, at this Christmas time, the 
world is in sorrow, it is especially 
fitting that I send a message of 
greeting and of faith. Tne world 
has created'for itself a divilization 
capable of giving to mankind security 
and peace firmly set in the foundations 
of religious teachings. Yet, though 
it has conquered the earth, the sea 
and even the air, civilization l~day 
passes through war and travail. 
In continuing the President showed evidence that elouds 
of war were gradually approaching. He continued: 
Because the people of this nation 
have come to a realization that time 
and distance no longer exist in the 
olden sense, they understand that 
which harms one segment of humanity 
harms all the rest. They know that 
only by friendly association between 
the seekers of light and the seekers of 
peace everywhere can the forces of 
evil be overcome. 12 
11 International Conciliation, No. 357, 49. 
12 Ibid., 50. 
• 
In reply to this message Pope Pius XII declared: 
We have been particularly impressed 
by one characteristic feature of 
your Excellency's message: the 
vital, spirtual contact with the 
thoughts and feelings, the hopes 
and the aspirations of the masses 
of the people, of those classes, 
namely, on whom more than others, 
and in a measure never felt before, 
weighs the burden of sorrow and 
sacrifice imposed by the present 
restless tempestuous hour •••. In 
fact our own daily experience tells 
us of the deep-seated yearning for 
peace that fill§ the hearts of the 
common people. l , 
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From these conflicting shades of opinions it can be 
accurately predicted that the place which the League of 
Nations deserves in the history of this period will doubtless 
be the subject of controversy for decades to come. 
There is a truism of the law that "justice long delayed 
is justice denied" and this seems all too evident in the case 
of the League of Nations. From what we have seen the people 
apparently were in favor of the League in 1919. The election 
of 1920 was not a mandate against the League as was later 
interpreted. The people went to the polls and voted not 
against the League in particular but against Wilson and his 
administration. 
13 Ibid., 51 
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Disillusionment had enveloped the country partly 
because of the Treaty of Versailles. Few were satisfied 
with its provisions. The German element thought it unfair 
and those of Irish and Italian extraction were disappointed 
by the outcome. Disillusionment was also felt because 
during the war America was told and led to believe that she 
was fighting for an exalted cause that she was fighting 
tlto llake the world safe for democracy". When the soldiers 
returned and realized that this had not been achieved they 
too were disillusioned. That their efforts bad apparently 
been in vain made them want to let Europe take care of its 
self and to wash their hands of the whole affair. 
That the League of Nations was analyzed to defeat 
seems true for if the League had been presented to the 
people of the nation in a national referendum at the time 
it was presented to the Senate there seems little doubt 
from the evidence we have examined that this would have been 
the overwhelming victory in favor of the League. This would 
have been the mandate •.. The people would have enjoined 
Congress to vote to accept membership in the League. 
i 
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Bear in mind this would have been presented before the 
Senate had brought out all the imaginable and some 
unimaginable pitfalls that would befall the United States 
if she enter the League. By the time the Senate had 
haggled and struggled over this, the fire of their spirit 
had cooled into a firm nationalism. They had become wholly 
disillusioned that the good fight they had fought had not 
been a total victory but had opened new and broader avenues 
of discontent. The fight had been futile. Certainly it 
had not savedthe world for democracy. So the publio sentiment 
turned from one of helpfulness to that of disillusionment. 
The general opinion was that we fought and won their 
fight now the least they could do was to bandage the 
wounds and recuperate without our assistanoe. 
Through the years the League as an issue was dusted 
off and brought out for an airing in order to stir up this 
purposeful indignation but we never find the publio aroused 
to a frenzy over its aoceptanoe or rejeotion. Evidenoe of 
\ 
thiS is presented in the following manner. 
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1919-21 1922-24 1925-28 1929-32 1932-35 1935-37 1937-39 1939-41 
This graph shows the number of entries in the Readers 
Guide to Periodical Literature under the heading "League of 
Nations" • Not all of these articles were favorable to the 
League, on the contrary some were in direct opposition to it. 
Though this graph does not show the degree or intensity of 
attitudes toward the League, during this period, it does 
Show the degree of interest the nation showed toward the I 
hz 
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League and this is one means of obtaining a true reflection 
of the attitudes. This is not an indication of attitudes 
pro or con but it is a barometer of interest. By analyzing 
this evidence of interest we can see that interest in the 
League certainly was far from static. It fluctuated 
throughout this period but the general trend was always 
down, less and less interest was shown from the zenith 1n 
1919 to an almost negligible degree in 1939. In the period 
1919 to 1921 it was found that 586 entries were listed; in 
the 1922 to 1924 period there were 279; a very slight 
increase to 282 was evident in 1925 to 1928; in the next 
grouping 1929 to 1932, 216 entries were found; from 1932 
to 1935 there were 230 listed; 1935 to 1937 only 125 articles 
were listed; in the last period a drop to 39 was evident. 
From 586 items in 1919 to 39 in 1939 is certainly a decrease 
of importance in a twenty year period. 
That it is difficult to refrain from estimating the 
actions of the American people and of their representatives 
~uring this period 1919 to 1939 1s true. From the vantage 
point of 1948 it becomes all too easy to give sage advice and 
leaves us wondering why such mistakes must be made. It 
I I 
'I 
certainly facilates an examination but it does not give a 
true picture, the features, the movements are distorted. 
1.. 
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We certainly have not sucoeeded in reta·ining the peace so 
sought for at this time so perhaps it would have been to 
our advantage to have joined the League of Nations in 1919. 
Who can say what course of action would have been best? 
Certainly it is not fair to say as some have that the full 
blame for the default of the League of Nations rests on the 
shoulders of the United States. Certainly if all other 
nations of the world had joined together to maintain the 
peace and did, the United States would not have been the 
nation to break this charm. 
The peace problem should be considered in the light 
of practical politics. We can no longer dream of it in 
terms of idealism. When we face it on these terms we realize 
how vast a change is called for in the proposal to rid the 
world of war. 
Now we have an advantage over those who lived during 
this time, those who were too close to view it in its entire 
perspective. We have the advantage of time. We are far 
enough removed from the phenomenon that we can see it less 
disturbed by the immediate preoccupations of statesmanship 
I' 
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than was possible at that time of conception. Though this 
clarity of vision as to the ultimate end to be achieved is 
ours we cannot take full advantage of this and still give the 
historical corrective. 
Therefore, lest we turn to cast judgment on whether or 
not the past proposals achieved all that was claimed for 
them by their proponents, we should pause a moment to meditate 
on just what it would mean today for the nations of the world 
to renounce their most potent policies. 
Little hope can be offered the peoples of the world 
until each and everyone of them wishes the abolition of 
war and the maintenance of peace. Even the word maintenance 
is too hopeful a word for by its very connotation it assumes 
that peace is existent and that it is just to be affirmed -
Oh, that that were true - flit is a consummation devoutly to 
be wished." 
Peace seems to be all too easy a condition to idealize 
but all too difficult a problem for the world to solve. 
This solution will never be obtained until it is earnestly 
invoked in the heart of man. 
CHAPTER VI 
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES 
SOURCE MATERIAL 
1. Government Publications 
The Congressional Record, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D. C. All volumes of the 
Record pertinent to this period were investigated. 
Especially thorough examination was given volumes 
59 to 79 which yielded many evidences of attitudes. 
These volumes were indispensable to a thorough analysis 
of the subject. The United States and the Pennanent 
- ---
Court of International Justice, United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1930. 
Contains documents relating to the question of American 
accession to the Court. Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry Appointed ~ the League of Nations, United 
States Government Printing Office, 1932. The title of 
this document stated clearly its contents in relation 
to Manchuria. Senate Document No. 55, 72nd Congress, 
1st Session, United States Printing Office, 1932. 
This document relates to the conditions in Manch1.U'lia. 
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It was transmitted from President Hoover to the Senate 
where it was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations for advisem~nt. The ~ of Paris - Three 
Years of Development, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1932, is an 
address broadcast by, Secretary of State, Henry L. 
Stimson. 
2. General Publications 
The Democratic !!!! ~ - 1920, issued by the Democratic 
National Committee, 1920 and The Republican ~ Book -
1920 were both used to obtain the party platforms in 
this election. Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, 
The 1924 Campaign - !E Analysis, Richard R. Smith, 
New York, 1927 and by the same authors: The 1928 
Campaign - An Analysis, Richard R. Smith, New York, 
1931 and The 1932 Campaign - An Analysis, Farrar and 
Rinehart, Incorporated, New York, 1935. Explanations 
of the vote and interpretations of its meaning are 
presented. Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1934, 
and by the same author They Voted !2! Roosevelt, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1947. 
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These two volumes give a complete analysis of voting 
since 1896 to 1944 including many maps, tables and 
graphs. Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of 
International Relations, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1925, is a very scholarly treatise on the 
Court • David Hunter Millet, The Peace ~ 2! P~a~r~i_s, 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928. This presents a thoroggh 
study of the Kellogg Peace Pact stressing the legal 
aspects with an excellent documentary appendix 
containing all the published correspondence pertaining 
to the negotiations of the Pact. James T. Shotwell, 
War As An Instrument £! National Policy, Harcourt 
Brace and Company, New York, 1929. The Prefaoe to 
this volume contains the author's opinions which were 
indicative of that period and of the leaders of the 
movement. As Director of Economics and History for 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace he has 
been able to exert his influence to further the peace 
movement. An instance of the furtherance of this 
influence is evident in his later book, Qa the Rim of th 
Abyss, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1936. 
i 
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Arthur N. Holcombe, ~ Political Parties Qf To-Day, 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1924. 
Presents a general treatment of the Republican and 
Democratic party politics. Woodrow Wilson, ~ Hope 
of the World, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1920. 
Gives evidences of Wilson's attitude toward the 
League during 1919 which is reflected through the 
messages and aqdresses delivered by him during 1919, 
including his country-wide speeches in behalf of the 
Treaty and the Covenant. 
3. Publications of Learned Organizations 
International Conc.ilia1tLG:1I}, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, New York, Volumes numbered 228 
to 363 yielded an inestimable amount of pertinent 
source material. World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 
Volume 7, Published by the World Peace Foundation, 
Boston, 1924. These pamphlets are similar to those 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
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and were used because they contained opinions and 
attitudes of authorities in the field under investigatio • 
The Annals, Published by the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science is an excellent publication 
worthy of extensive use. Volumes of the years 1931-1936 
I. 
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were most helpful for the topiCS under consideration. 
Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Volumes 
3-6, Foreign Policy Association, New York 1928. The 
appendix to volume 3 contained the texts of the Hotes 
exchanged between United States and France for the 
outlaw of war. The American Journal E! International 
~, Volume 27, Published by the American Society of 
International Law, New York, 1933. This was utilized 
for the relation of the Pact of Paris to the Manchurian 
dispute. A feature of this publioation entitled 
"Chronicle of International Events" proved to be 
an excellent and unanticipated source of bibliographical 
material. 
4. Biographies - Autobiographies 
Ray Stannard Baker, !oodrow Wilson: His hl!! ~ Letters 
Volumes 1-6, Garden City, 1927-1937. A great work by 
the authorized biographer of Wilson, the founder of 
the League of Nations. Henry Cabot Lodge, ~ Senate 
and ~ League 2! Nations, The Maomillan Company, 
New York, 1925. An apologia of his life which reveals 
the Senator's bitter partisanship. Samuel Gompers, 
Seventy Years of Life ~ Labor - ~ Autobiography, 
I.~. . ~ 
.~ 
----------------------------.... ~ 
2 Volumes, E. P. Dutton and Company New York, 1925, 
was useful in giving Gompers own views and his 
interpretation of labor's attitude concerning the 
League. Henry L. Stimson, The !!r Eastern CriSiS, 
Harper and Brothers, New York, 1936. This volume is 
anautobiograppy dealing exclusively with Secretary 
Stimson's work in the Manchurian dispute. David 
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Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
New York, 1937 is a very sympathetic treatment of 
Kellogg's entire life though emphasiS is laid upon 
his work for the Kellogg Peace Pact. It is vitalized 
through direct memoranda of Mr. Kellogg's. 
5. Periodicals 
The Literary Digest, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New 
York. It would be futile to list the volumes consulted 
for practically every volume of this publication from 
1919 to its expiration was utilized. These volumes 
were indispensable. Current History, Volumes 18, 21, 
31 and 35, The New York Times Company, were consulted 
for timely evidences of opinions as was: ~ Nation, 
Volumes 127, The Nation Incorporated, New York, 1928, 
and The Outlook, The Outlook Company, New York, 1924. 
Congressional Digest, A. Gram Robinson and Norborne 
I~--------~ 
152 
T. N. Robinson, Publishers, 1923. This is an excellent 
and unusual publication. Both favorable and unfavorable 
opinions of well known personalities on timely subjects 
are presented With no alteration and very little 
interpretation. Two foremost Catholic periodicals 
were employed. America, Volume 53, The American 
Press, New York City, 1919 and ~ Catholic World, 
Volumes 141 and 150, Paulist Press, 1935 and 1939 
, 
respectively. The article entitled "Editorial Comment" 
gave a clear view of Catholic thought by a recognized 
authority. 
The following newspapers were used in compiling this 
paper: ~ York Sun, New York Tribune, Chicago Daily 
!!!!, Chicago Daily Tribune and finally but by no 
means the least important was The ~ York Times. 
This newpaper proved to be the source of a wealth 
of material. It seemed impartial in most cas~s and 
objective in its viewpoint. The further utilization 
of this newspaper was greatly aided through the use of 
The!!! !2!! Times Index Volumes 1919 to 1939. 
Published by !h! ~ !2!! Times, Times Square, New York, 
1919-1939. These volumes proved to be a time saver 
• 
b 
in using not only the Times but also other 
available newspapers. It was helpful in locating 
a specific item and in placing an approximate date 
that, that item was discussed in the newspapers 
of the country. 
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